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ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS

by

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March 2006

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ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS

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ABSTRACT

The stance of the Balkans towards global Islamic extremism has been much discussed, but little subject to substantive comparative inquiry. In this thesis I utilize social movement theory to analyze the relation between Islamic revivalism and the global Salafi jihad in the Balkans. Comparing Bosnia and Bulgaria, I not only demonstrate the various manifestations of these phenomena but also argue for a differentiated case-by-case approach when implementing the suggested analytical framework.

I effectively show that the process of Islamic revivalism is mainly an imported phenomena maintained through the financial and ideological support from the Middle East. I also prove that there is no causal relationship between the Islamic revivalism and global Salafi jihad. Yet, the findings of the case studies caution against the possibility of structural and ideological convergence of the two phenomena that could effectively lead to the emergence of permissive environment for the spread of global Salafi jihad.

I also argue that the current Islamic revival poses security threat to the region due to its potential of developing into viable Islamic movements on the ground. I conclude that to counter such security implications, the Balkan governments need to revisit their policies and adopt a proactive approach qualitatively different from the US Global War on Terror strategic framework.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIY	Active Islamic Youth (in Bosnian Aktivna Islamska Omladina)
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
GSJ	Global Salafi Jihad
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ITAN	Islamic Transnational Advocacy Network
IZ	Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community) – The Official Muslim Organization in Bosnia
MRF	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander - Europe
SDA	Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action)
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SNA	Social Network Analysis
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Networks

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GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS

Chief Mufti	the head of the Islamic community in a Balkan state. Often it is also referred as reis-ul-ulema – in Arabic “the head of the clergy.”
Madhab	The word <i>madhhab</i> is derived from an Arabic word meaning "to go" or "to take as a way", and refers to a <i>mujtahid's</i> choice in regard to a number of interpretive possibilities in deriving the rule of Allah from the primary texts of the Qur'an and hadith on a particular question. In a larger sense, a <i>madhhab</i> represents the entire school of thought of a particular <i>mujtahid</i> Imam, such as Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafi'i, or Ahmad--together with many first-rank scholars that came after each of these in their respective schools, who checked their evidences and refined and upgraded their work.
Madrassa	The word is used in Arabic in all the contexts that the word school is in English: for private, public and parochial schools, and for any elementary or secondary schools, whether Muslim, of other religions, or secular.
Maktab	elementary informal Islamic religious school
Mjusjulmani	in Bosnian – Muslims
Mufti	A mufti is an Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Islamic law (Sharia), capable of issuing fataawa (plural of "fatwa"). Hence Chief Mufti – the head of the Islamic community in a Balkan state.
mujahid (pl. mujahidin) –	fighter (fighters).
umma	umma is an Arabic word meaning community or nation. In the context of Islam, the word <i>umma</i> (often spelled ummah) is used to mean the community of the believers (<i>ummat al-mu'minin</i>), and thus the whole Islamic world.
Waqf	A waqf is a religious endowment in Islam, typically devoting a building or plot of land for Muslim religious purposes

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I. INTRODUCTION, APPROACHING THE ISSUE OF ISLAMIC REVIVAL, AND DEFINING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

All through the twentieth century the modern world has wanted to bury religion at the level of an individual's private life. Now, for some decades, one has seen a return in strength of ostentatious religions, which threaten the public space they occupy, break with the society they are in struggle against it.

Farhad Khosrokhavar,
Les Nouveaux Martyrs d'Allah, 2002

A. INTRODUCTION

The global revival of ethnic and religious identity at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of twenty-first century is a fact that has manifested itself in many ways, from the emergence of the Islamic republic of Iran, through the establishment of the first de facto Muslim country in Europe - Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, to the impact that it had on the 2004 presidential elections in the United States. Still, despite the resurgence of all religions, Islam has been in the center of the main debate, which, both in the West and in the Muslim world, has been circling around the contentious link¹ between Muslim religion and the surge of terrorist acts in the past decade.

In this vein, the Madrid (03/11/2004) and London bombings (07/07/2005) not only led to further exploitation of such a possible link, but has also challenged the vitality of multiculturalism in Europe and put in question the viability of German, British and French models of integration of Muslims into the secular western societies.² The November 2005 riots in France and parts of Germany showed the chasm between immigrant Muslims and the Europe's mainstream societies. At the same time, the observed Islamic revival through the Internet and Middle Eastern satellite TV not only widened this gap but allowed for the radical activists to intimidate the large moderate

1 For an extreme example, see Shmuel Bar, "Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism," *Policy Review Online*, available from www.policyreview.org/jun04/bar.html, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

2 Martin Walker, "Walker's World: Europe's Islamic Fears," *M&C News*, November 7, 2005, http://news.monstersandcritics.com/europe/article_1060347.php/Walker%60s_World_Europe%60s_Islamic_fears, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

Muslim population in Europe.³ According to German polls conducted in the summer of 2005, the majority of Muslims do not want to adapt to Western values, and one-third wants Islam to become state religion in every European country.⁴

Not only do such facts confirm the increased importance of Europe as a battleground of the current “terror war,”⁵ but they also raise security concerns about the alleged growing threat of tiny minorities of homegrown extremists who have been drawn to the Islamist violence of Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.⁶

In addition, the observed phenomena – Islamic revival and Global Salafi jihad, led to the recent re-emergence of the Balkans as a contested territory viewed by the West as a bridgehead in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) (in light with the current engagements in the Middle East) and, by the radical Islamists, as a gateway for Islamic penetration in Western Europe. The former is exemplified by the planned opening of three U.S. bases in Bulgaria and Romania in 2006 in addition to the strong European military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter is demonstrated by the resurgence of Muslim religion through the spread of the Mosque Network and *madrassas* allegedly proselytizing Wahhabi Islam.

B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM – ISLAMIC EXTREMISM VS. ISLAMIC REVIVAL

1. Background

While on the sidelines of some of the latest events, the Balkans has been affected for the last fifteen years by the same trends in Islamic resurgence that the EU recently started to pay attention to. The region has been in the focus of the terrorist experts and analysts since the early 1990s. In the face of initial lack of response by the international community (UN, OSCE and mainly the U.S.) to the 1992-1995 war in ex-Yugoslavia, not only was Al Qaeda provided with an opportunity to infiltrate the Balkans, but also the

3 Michael Taarnby, “The European Battleground,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 2, Issue 23, December 02, 2004, http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=3161&article_id=2368947, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

4 Ibid.

5 The term *terror war* has been suggested by Dr. John Arquilla at the Naval Postgraduate School during class discussions in December 2004 as one better encompassing the U.S.-led coalition counterterrorist efforts rather than the commonly used GWOT.

6 For more information see Martin Walker’s “Walker’s World: Europe’s Islamic Fears,” in note 2 above.

government of Bosnia and Herzegovina⁷ (henceforth Bosnia) had to revert and accept the overall assistance⁸ of the larger part of the Islamic world, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran, to secure its survival. Thus, the interplay of both internal (socio-economic, religious and identity crises) and external (spread of transnational advocacy network, Islamic activism and foreign threat) factors led to the resurfacing or reemergence of Islam in the region. These processes and developments have not been limited only to Bosnia. They have raised certain controversy and public debate in all Balkan states that have an indigenous Muslim population, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia. In this respect, the current Islamic revival opens up the possibility of the resumption of the Balkans' historical role as the gateway for the transmission of ideas, values, resources, and the spread of social networks from the Middle East. Nevertheless, the issue of Islamic revival has been either conflated with the threat of Islamic terrorism or viewed as an intrinsic part of the spread of the terrorist networks.

The July 2004 report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (known as the 9/11 commission) referred to the Balkans as “a region potentially vulnerable to terrorists due to significant Muslim populations and weak border controls and security services.”⁹ In addition, “many experts do not view the Balkans as a key region harboring or funding terrorists, at least when compared to the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe.”¹⁰ According to U.S. Army Major General Virgil Packett II, the former NATO commander of the multinational Stabilization Force in northeastern Bosnia, “With a 1,400 kilometer border, Bosnia and Herzegovina was formerly a sanctuary for terrorism, but now it is a gateway for terrorism.”¹¹

7 Throughout the thesis, all references to Bosnia actually refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

8 Slavejko Sasajkovski, “Political Islam” and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *New Balkan Politics* no. 2 (2001) http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/OldSite/Issue_2/sasajkovski.eng.asp, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

9 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 2004, 366-367, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

10 Steven Woehrel, “Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans,” *Congressional Research Service Reports*, July 26, 2005, 1, <http://www.crsdocuments.com>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

11 Joel E. Starr, “How to Outflank al Qaeda in the Balkans,” *European Affairs* (Fall 2004).

The few local (emic) accounts often pushed forward by Serbian or Macedonian security experts view the Balkans and especially Bulgaria as “a springboard for terrorist operations in Western Europe” because of the key geostrategic position of the country through which the illegal traffic of drugs and weapons flows.¹²

The prevalent political position emerging from the recent security seminar in Sofia attended by SACEUR Gen. James Jones does not differ considerably from the established U.S. and Western perceptions that view the greatest terrorist threat to the world as “the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMD.”¹³

Nevertheless, the recent developments on the ground call for further elaborate analyses beyond the existing ones. On August 30, 2005, for the first time the leading Bosnian weekly magazine “Slobodna Bosna” (Free Bosnia), whose editor is Senad Avdic, a moderate Muslim, issued a report that claimed that terrorist training camps have been situated near the Jablanica and Boracko Lakes in Herzegovina, but later moved to another location: “At the beginning of August this year the Active Islamic Youth organized a big camp ... apart from Active Islamic Youth, the Wahabi Islamic movement has been gathering strength in Bosnia.”¹⁴ In addition, on October 19, 2005, Bosnian police arrested a group that was planning to blow up the British embassy in Sarajevo.¹⁵ It turned out that the group had contacts with cells in Britain and Denmark where similar arrests ensued a week later. Of particular concern is the fact that despite the reports that the core of such Islamic militants has been the remained after 1992-1995 war foreign

12 “Serbian Experts: Bulgaria Is a Key Target for the Terrorists in the Region” [Сръбски експерти: България е ключова мишена за терористите в региона] (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own) *netinfo.bg*, November 23, 2005, <http://news.netinfo.bg/index.phtml?tid=40&oid=805928>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

13 “Bulgaria in the Reach of the Terrorist Organizations” [България в обсега на терористичните организации] *SEGA* (Internet edition), November 21, 2005, <http://www.segabg.com/online/article.asp?issueid=2015§ionid=2&id=0000202>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

14 “Bosnia: Muslim Newspaper Points to the Existence of Islamic Terror Camps,” *adnkronosinternational*, August 30, 2005, http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Security&loid=8.0.202217820&par=0, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

15 “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in Balkans: Arrests Point to Attacks within Europe,” *Washington Post*, December 1, 2005.

(predominantly) Afghan mujaheddins,¹⁶ for the first time two of the individuals involved in the plots are not only Bosnian citizens but also ethnic Bosnians – Bajro Ikanovic and Almir Bajric.

Meanwhile, the brewing controversies among the local Islamic communities over allegations of spreading radical Islam started to acquire higher public profile. There had already been uneasy coexistence between the Islamic Zajednica (Islamic Community - IZ) in Bosnia and Active Islamic Youth (AIY) that basically led to some areas of the country effectively out of the control of those appointed by the IZ imams.¹⁷ In the case of Bulgaria, for the last several years (essentially since 2001), the Chief Mufti of the Muslim community in the country has been accused of turning the existing religious schools and mosques into centers for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Starting in 2004, the Bulgarian media has often seized on the allegations of fundamentalism and the perceived threat from extremists, sparking an often-panicked public debate on the degree of Islamic influence in the country. The influential weekly Kapital, for example, recently published its own investigation into radical Islamism inside Bulgaria, alleging contacts between the office of the chief mufti and various Arabic organizations, and highlighting what it describes as a lack of transparency in the management of Muslim schools and institutions.¹⁸

Against such a background, the need of operationalizing the observed Islamic revival by charting its manifestations, influences and projecting the possible socio-cultural changes that it might or already has been inducing in the specific socio-cultural terrain in the Balkans search has become an issue of the highest security priority.

16 Here, I use the term in a way that connotes the Wikipedia definition: (Arabic: مجاهد, also transliterated as *mujāhidīn*, *mujahedeen*, *mujahedin*, *mujahidin*, *mujaheddin*, etc.) is a plural form of *mujahid* (مجاهد), which literally means “struggler”, someone who engages in jihad, or “struggle”, but is often translated in the West as “holy warrior”. In the late twentieth century, the term “mujahedeen” became popular in the Western media to describe various armed fighters who subscribe to *militant* Islamic ideologies, although there is not always an explicit “holy” or “warrior” meaning within the word. For more see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mujaheddin>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

17 Ahmet Alibasi, “C-SIS Working paper No 2: Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *Cambridge Security Programme*, 2003, 21-22, <http://www.cambridge-security.net/pdf/alibasic.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

18 See Albena Shkodrova and Iva Roudnikova’s article, “Bulgaria: Investigation. Muslim Infighting Fuels Media Fundamentalist Fears,” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) Balkan Crisis Report*, No. 519, October 7, 2004, <http://archiv2.medienhilfe.ch/News/2004/SEE/IWPR519.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

C. ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS - RESEARCH QUESTIONS, WORKING HYPOTHESES AND PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

1. Research Questions

In its attempt to decipher the trajectory and the security implications of the Islamic revival, this study embarks upon answering the following research question - does the observed process of Islamic revival (IR) in the Balkans pose a security threat to the region in the context of the rise of global Salafi jihad (GSJ)?

This question puts forward two issues. First, it poses the problem of how the current phenomena should be operationalized in terms of its origins, scope, structural agents and social dynamic. Here, I suggest the implementation of an interdisciplinary approach having at its premises a social movement theory that allows for the interpretation of the Islamic revival in the context of the broader phenomena of Islamic activism.¹⁹ Second, the above question entails two subsidiary research questions which necessitate a relevant set of countermeasures - (a) does IR constitute the initial phase of the emergence of Islamic social movement dynamics on the ground, and (b) is there a causal relationship or other type of connection between the Islamic revival on the Balkans and the spread of Global Salafi jihad?

2. Working Hypotheses

In this respect, the suggested interdisciplinary approach based on Social Movement Theory (SMT) will be used to test the following working hypotheses.

First, the process of Islamic revival is mainly an imported (edic) phenomenon (H1). Second, the observed Islamic revival, depending on the characteristics of the social terrain²⁰ in the different Balkan states, constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of local Islamic movements (H2). Third, there is no causal relationship between the Islamic revival and Global Salafi jihad (H3). Nevertheless, they share common organizational

¹⁹ Here I purposefully use the Quintan Wiktorowicz (*Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana University Press, 2003) definition of Islamic activism as “the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes,” (p. 2). Thus, it accommodates the variety of contentions that frequently emerge under the banner of “Islam,” including propagation movements, terrorist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.

²⁰ Defined by Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, *Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest* (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), social terrain refers to the “social elements that tie individuals together” (p. 73).

and ideological characteristics that provide a contingent link between the two phenomena. The categorization of such a contingent link as relational or non-relational depends on the level of social appropriation of the Islamic causes as a result of the Islamic revival developing some of the characteristics of local social movement.

3. Conclusions

First, the process of the Islamic revival, though often conflated with the spread of the Global Salafi jihad, is a phenomenon qualitatively different from the latter one. Second, on the Balkans what is known as the international demonstration effect has a reverse dynamic. In most cases it links indigenous local movements, thus providing a global scene for their agenda which leads to international pressure that result in their socialization in the target state – something described as the *Boomerang effect* by Kick and Sikkink. Nevertheless, in the Balkans Islamic revival mainly constitutes an imported phenomenon, which through the spread of transnational advocacy networks such as the Mosque network, NGO and charities, provides mobilizing structures and religious framings that account for the emergence of certain social movement dynamics on the ground.

Third, the main contention of this work is that the observed Islamic revival that relies on the above organizational agents does pose security threats to the regional and state security. Nevertheless, these threats are not only different from the ones directly associated with Islamic extremism, but also call for coordinated regional and state countermeasures that differ from the current ones.

Depending on the case, such security threats can be briefly classified as follows:

a. State with a Minority Muslim Population

- Continuing isolation of minority religious population from the rest of the society thus allowing for the possible emergence of Islamic-based political parties that could jeopardize the social peace and create certain social movement dynamics that call for territorial changes or autonomy.
- Such isolation allows for the provision of unfettered material support for GSJ through the established ITAN and mosque networks. This material support should be viewed more as a permissive environment for individuals that essentially constitute regional hubs for the GSJ network.

- Contentious dynamics between the different ethnic groups that can be used by neighboring states and internal and/or external actors to destabilize the region.

b. State with a Majority Muslim Population

- Social movement dynamics already developing on the ground mainly through youth organizations and informal groups.
- Strong drive from material to moral support to GSJ.
- Providing safe haven, logistic and recruitment base for the extremist or radical elements in order to mount or facilitate operations in Europe.

D. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

1. Methodology

Comparative case study analysis is the methodology used in this study. Such a methodological approach will allow for exploring the issues against the specific socio-cultural settings of the target states. For the purpose of this thesis, a somewhat artificial dichotomy is suggested between states with minority and majority Muslim population in order to provide better insights in terms of security indications and warnings, as well as policy recommendations.

The primary case is the Islamic revival in Bosnia as a state that has a majority Muslim population and in which the current phenomena has been catalyzed by the 1992-1995 war. The secondary case study is focused on Bulgaria, a state with a central geostrategic situation on the Balkans that often has been quoted as the “most successful ethnic model” in Europe.

The findings of the case studies are based on open primary sources such as Congressional hearings, field studies, academic studies and national statistics. In addition, the author used both Western and local media publications, books, Internet articles, and web forums that provided for an emic perception of the issues on the ground.

2. Building the Analytical Framework

a. Current Analytical Approaches

The first step in understanding why there is a need for a new approach and analytical framework to operationalize the current Islamic revival is to elaborate on some of the problems with the current one. Most of the recent analyses of the Balkans claim that the region poses major security concerns due to the developed “nexus among

terrorists, narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized crime networks.”²¹ These reports are based on information in periodicals and do not incorporate the issue of Islamic revival in their analytical framework.

Another set of approaches has put the issue of the current Islamic revival in the context of the spread of *Islamic terrorism* and/or *New Economy of Terror*. This framework has been put forward by authors like Loretta Napoleoni, Yossef Bodansky and Stephen Schwarz.²² Though providing some general insights, these authors interpret the spread of the agents of Islamic revival such as the Mosque Network and faith-based NGOs as part of the terror network or Islamic economics. Even the recent Congressional hearing, in addition to the demonstrated underestimation of the problem, has also lumped together an Islamic youth organization in Bosnia with Al Qaeda. The problem with such an approach is that it lumps Islamic revival with Islamic extremism and it necessarily treats the Islamic resurgence as serving a self-fulfilling role of spreading the terror networks and promoting terrorism.

As a counterpoint to the above approaches, Michael Innes (2004) argued that a model of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries rooted in post-9/11 strategic thought and the global war on terror (GWOT) is inadequate to the study of terrorism in Bosnia and the Balkans.²³ He raised concerns about the danger of overreaction of the local governments to Islamic activism. On the other hand, Innes also drew attention to the emergence of local Islamic groups that do not necessarily have the same agenda like the offshoots of Muslim Brotherhood in the region, for example. Nevertheless, despite the

21 Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan, *The Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe*, A Study Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the United States Governments, 2002. http://www.loc.gov/r/fdr/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

22 Loretta Napoleoni, *Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollar Behind the Terror Networks*, (Seven Stories Press, 2005), Yossef Bodansky, *Target the West: Terrorism in the World Today*, (S.P.I. Books, 1993) and “The Price of Washington’s Bosnia Policy,” Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 1998, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb98/bodansky.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005 and Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism*, (Anchor, 2003).

23 Michael Innes, “Terrorist Sanctuary and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional Assumptions,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28, (2005) 295, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/pgkumqumq9a1t79trn/contributions/n/3/6/k/n36k32x53kn4r324.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

fact that he calls for better understanding of the local socio-cultural and ethnic characteristics of the region, his analysis still views them in relation to the spread of international terrorism.

Some of the recent academic works using SNA²⁴ (Social Network Analysis) and Nexus Topography²⁵ have been aimed at operationalizing the current Global Salafi jihad²⁶ and Islamic activism, thus mapping the social terrain in which these phenomena thrive. Though not specifically addressing the issue of Islamic revival, these studies provide valuable insights into some of the social dynamics on the ground by offering an analysis of the “weak links,” cliques, and embedding of the terror networks in certain socio-cultural settings. Nevertheless, these studies do not incorporate the Balkans as part of their analysis and have not been aimed at operationalizing the Islamic revival in the region in relation to the spread of GSJ.

The issue of Islamic revival as such has been of academic interest mainly in line with the emergence of Islamic social movements in the Middle East and North Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century.²⁷ Nevertheless, to a certain extent, the current phenomenon witnessed in the Balkans follows its own trajectory that is different from the one in the Middle East. Certainly, the revivalist traditions of the latter have as its foundation several conceptualizations involving the terms *tajdid* (regeneration, renewal), *takfir* (calling someone an unbeliever, even Muslims), *jihad*, and transformation of concepts like *jahiliyyah* and *tawhid*.²⁸ Yet, the current dynamics and trends in the Balkans are contextually different from those described above.

24 For more information see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004).

25 Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson, *Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of National Interest* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005).

26 This thesis uses Marc Sageman's (2004) definition of Global Salafi jihad: “It is not a specific organization, but a social movement consisting of a set of more or less formal organizations, linked in patterns of interaction ...Participants in the global Salafi jihad are not atomized individuals but actors linked to each other through complex webs of direct and mediated exchanges,” (p. 137).

27 For more see Carrie Rosefsky, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2004) and Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam* (Columbia, University Press, New York, 2005).

28 For further discussion, see John Obert Voll, “The Revivalist Heritage,” in *The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography* by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, John Obert Voll, and John L. Esposito (with Kathleen Moore and David Sawan), (Greenwood Press, CT, 1991), 24-31.

b. Balkans Specifics

First, the embedded heterogeneous Muslim minorities have either Slavic (that converted to Islam) or Turkish origins. For the last fifteen years such a differentiation determined the scope, sources and target groups of Islamic activism, one inspired through the Middle Eastern (Islamic) influence aimed at the Slavic Muslim minority, while the other had to do more with Pan-Turkism.

Second, the endemic problems of corruption and lack of strict rule of law (more endemic in the Western Balkans) are exacerbated by the often Islam phobic authorities and/or general public perceptions. The latter has to do with the strong societal memories of almost 500 years of Turkish rule in the Balkans. Such manifestations have led to strong chauvinistic sentiments in ex-Yugoslavia under Milosevic. Thus, the rise of nationalism has been further catalyzed by the still prevalent perception of the religion as a form of identity in the Balkans, a factor that also accounts for the emergence of a new state in the region – Bosnia. Another consequence of such historically predisposed sentiments is also the destructive potential they have for the national security as they lend themselves to any manipulative attempts to interpret social or ethnic conflicts as religious ones. The 2005 Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria provide the most recent example as the newly founded party “Ataka” (Attack) with an outright chauvinistic political platform won several seats in the National Assembly.

Third, there has been strong U.S. influence in the Balkans that not only led to the involvement of several Balkan states in Iraq (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania), but also made it necessary for the local governments to adopt more or less the U.S. vision and strategy for the global war on terror. Without getting into the details of the latter, it is suffice to note that in combination with the lack of comprehensive EU policy towards Muslim minorities,²⁹ local governments are left without a comprehensive strategy for the emerging issues at home. In reference to the latter, the influx of immigrants (legal and illegal) from the Middle East and the gloomy economic situation in most of the states in the region has been creating further security

²⁹ As the demonstrations of November 2005 in France, Belgium and Germany have shown.

challenges. Thus, the current security measures are focused on border control, etc, but rarely backed up by any comprehensive measures within the state that account for the social dynamics.

c. *Analytical Framework*

This thesis is focused on researching the phenomenon of Islamic revival (IR) in relation to the global Salafi jihad (GSJ) and establishing a possible causal or other connection between them. In pursuit of an answer to the stated research questions and in terms of testing the working hypotheses, the author suggests an analytical framework based on a multidisciplinary approach built upon the social movement theory (SMT) and relevant anthropological studies.

Though there has been no sufficiently coherent body of theory concerning social movements, social movement theory (SMT), as pointed out by Robinson (2004), has emerged as a sort of middle ground approach in analyzing episodes of contentious collective actions, falling between structuralist and rational choice schools.³⁰ What is important for the purpose of this thesis is that both phenomena at stake can be analyzed as part of a bigger one, termed as “Islamic activism.”³¹ Here, the author uses Wiktorowicz’s (2004) definition of the latter as being “*the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes.*”³² Such a broad definition allows for the accommodation of the variety of contention that emerges under the banner of “Islam,” including propagation movements, terrorist groups, and collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly political movements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that promote Islamic spirituality through collective action.³³ Using the Islamic activism as an overlapping phenomenon that transcends the specificity of “Islam” as being a system of meaning, identity, and basis of collective action allows both phenomena at stake to be analyzed along a continuum on which IR and GSJ can be pictured at the extreme opposite sides (as depicted in Figure 1).

³⁰ Wiktorowicz, 113.

³¹ Ibid., p. 2.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.




Figure 1. Analytical Framework

Such an interpretation of the Islamic revival through SMT lenses provides a common analytical framework that can be used to test all three working hypotheses. Below I argue that though the interplay of all three factors (meaning, identity, and collective action) is inherent to the process of Islamic activism, the current empirical evidence has it that action has been the leading factor defining GSJ, while for the process of IR I build the case that such a factor is identity shift.

In reference to the former, Marc Sageman (2004) and Jason Burke (2003) have already tried to successfully operationalize the evolution of Al Qaeda, in particular, and global Salafi jihad, in general, on the premises that they have evolved into a global religious revivalist movement. According to Sageman (2004), global Salafi jihad is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of reestablishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries.³⁴ Such a definition also dovetails with the conclusion put forward by Jason Burke (2003):

We are now in the third phase, where ‘al-Qaeda’, neither a vanguard nor a base, is instead accurately characterized by the third translation I outlined: the methodology, the maxim, the precept, the rule, the way of seeing the world. The ‘hardcore’ is scattered, the ‘network of networks’ broken up. All that remains is the idea of ‘al-Qaeda’. You are a member of al-Qaeda if you say you are.³⁵

Of particular interest for the purpose of this thesis are Sageman’s findings about the process of joining jihad, specifically the importance of social bonds. Evaluating the results of his study against the Lofland-Stark theory, he puts forward a three-prong process of joining the jihad:

- Social affiliation with the jihad through friendship, kinship, and discipleship.
- Progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the Global Salafi jihad ideology.
- Formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the jihad.

34 Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 1.

35 Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 2004), 290.

Sageman (2004) confirms his conclusions by pointing out that “Social bonds are the critical element in the process (of becoming mujahed) and precede ideological commitment. These bonds facilitate the process of joining through mutual and social support, development of common identity, and encouragement to adopt new faith.”³⁶ Still, the main caveat to these findings is that these factors are internal to the group, thus they, by necessity, have a group dynamic. This is an important distinction characteristic of GSJ from the Islamic revival.

The issue of Islamic revival poses a greater challenge in terms of operationalizing it in the context of specific historic and social settings in the Balkans. SMT has been mainly concerned with already established social movements whose actors and contentious frames have been analyzed against the changes in the structure of political opportunities. The Islamic revival does not have the mobilization and contentious dynamics of a full-fledged movement, yet the author’s contention is that it has a powerful potential of evolving into one. Before offering an analytical framework that would explore whether IR constitutes the initial stage of the emergence of the Islamic social movement, a brief quest for its definition is due.

According to Charles Tilly (2004), “a social movement is a ‘sustained, organized public effort making collective claims at target authorities’ that uses a well-hewn contentious repertoire on the part of people who proclaim themselves to be worthy, unified, numerous, and committed.”³⁷ For Tarrow (1998), Islamic fundamentalism is a third [transnational social movement] even if it appears to take different forms in different parts of the world, from Afghanistani Taliban to Iranian nationalism to the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (citing Eickelman 1997; Kane 1997).³⁸

The term Islamic revival has often been used by some scholars as interchangeable with Islamic fundamentalism. The latter use in this regard does not connote the pejorative meaning that the term fundamentalism acquired after the Iranian revolution. In this respect, Islamic revivalism for the purpose of this thesis will be viewed

³⁶ Sageman, 135.

³⁷ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), 3-5.

³⁸ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185.

in terms of Islamic awakening and returning to the tenets and fundamentals of Islam. In itself such a definition accounts for an increased manifestation of Islamic practices and their stricter observance. In line with such an assumption, Asef Bayat (1998) suggested that the Islamic revival be viewed as the spread of (a) the institutions of Islam as general, such as mosques, Ulama, Islamic relief foundations, charities and NGOs, religious schools, (b) the Islamic proselytisation, in the form of Islamic literature, audio and video tapes, radio and TV, printed media, and (c) the growth of religiosity in society as a whole.³⁹ To a certain extent, Ahmet Alibasi (2003) used this framework and suggested that the current Islamic revival in Bosnia be analyzed through its manifestations as follows:⁴⁰

- (Re)construction of mosques finance by local and foreign money
- (Re)opening of new education institutions
- Publishing of Islamic texts and periodicals
- Intensified personal religiosity and use of Islamic social symbols (mosque attendance, hijab for women, and beard for men)
- Establishment of Muslim political organizations
- Emergence of Muslim solidarity organizations

Such a view of the Islamic revival that focuses on the manifestations does not necessarily account for changes. In this study, I argue that the process of Islamic revival viewed in the greater context of Islamic activism should also be analyzed in terms of dynamic change of social relations and identity. The latter should be understood as an individual or group identification with the tenets (fundamentals) of Islam that entail not only stricter observation of the religious duties but also increased role of Islamic principles as pertaining to the group behavior and/or practices.

Thus, the above described static and process approach will be used specifically for the suggested case studies. I use Bayat's approach as instrumental in grasping the current scope and parameters of the Islamic revival. Such an analysis will also provide insights into the structural agents of the current Islamic revival. More

³⁹ Here, I use the framework suggested by Asef Bayat in "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution: Comparing Islamist Activism in Iran and Egypt", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 40, no. 1, January 1998; and Ahmet Alibasi in "Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina," as cited in note 17.

⁴⁰ Alibasi, 14.

important, it will account for the supply and demand side of the phenomenon, and thus operationalize the Islamic revival in terms of whether it is an external (edict) or internal (edict).

For the purpose of analyzing the possible identity and social group dynamic changes, I will revert to the use of anthropological analyses based on conducted field studies. Such an approach is also aimed at providing background to what extent radical Islam has gained support among the populace at the expense of the traditional folk Islam. Both analytical approaches as integrated in the bigger analytical framework will allow for early delineation between the process of Islamic revival and Islamization – the former being a “demand” side issue while the latter a “supply” side.

Thus, the first tier of the suggested analytical framework will be the static and process approach backed by anthropological analysis of the possible social changes in the Muslim population on the Balkans. At tier two I will use the above suggested analytical framework centered upon SMT theory against which the hypotheses of the thesis will be tested.

For testing the hypotheses of the IR being the first stage of the emergence of SM, this study suggests the use of the analytical framework of Doug McAdam as depicted on the left side of Figure 1. Such a framework was put forward by McAdam in order to “understand how movement has developed initially and then spread beyond its local origins.” It is worth noting that Sageman’s and McAdam’s approach have certain overlaps. Nevertheless, they have different goals, as Sageman’s purpose is to operationalize the spread of GSJ as a revivalist social movement while McAdam’s is to try to discern how a movement emerges and develops. In this respect, the latter analytical approach is best suitable for testing the possible evolution of IR into an Islamic social movement.

In terms of the probable link between GSJ and IR, this study suggest a closer look at the common structural and organizational elements through which both phenomena allegedly thrive in the region – the Mosque network, faith-based NGOs,

Islamic schools and social hubs.⁴¹ Their role and impact will be viewed in the context of the spread of the Islamic transnational advocacy network. My contention is that they are not different in terms of their manifestations and dynamics from the other transnational advocacy networks (TAN) as described by Kick and Sikkink. Kick and Sikkink's insights about the TAN allow for (a) determining whether IR is an emic or edic phenomena, and (b) allow for investigating the possible link between IR and GSJ through these common structures. In relevance to the former I will use the Boomerang approach to test (a), while to the latter (b) the ITAN analytical framework will be implemented.

In regard to the above, ITAN will be viewed in the context of SM but still having their own dynamic and characteristics. Social movements are only one form along a spectrum of contention, as NGOs, labor movements, transnational coalitions, and elements of international institutions are important actors, even if their actions are not obviously 'social movement' actions.⁴² Nevertheless, the SMT approach should not be overestimated and accepted as universal. Thus it is important to point out that preliminary research shows that IR falls short of being a movement. "The conditions necessary to produce a sustained social movement that is, at once, integrated within several societies, unifies in its goals and organization, and capable of mounting contention against a variety of targets are hard to fulfill."⁴³ In this respect, it is worth building on Tarrow's framework of internationalism⁴⁴ and linking it to the networks of informal ties among NGOs and advocacy networks in transnational systems of migration, crime, contraband, religious activism and political activism.

In this respect it is worth delving into the role and importance of the transnational institutions and through their spread to analyze the current revivalist trends and possible future developments. As Tarrow pointed out, "Islamic fundamentalism grew up within one of the oldest transnational institutions in the world, with autonomous

41 Here, I suggest Mark Sageman's (2004) definition of a regional hub: "Some nodes are more popular and are attached to more links, connecting them to other more isolated nodes. These more connected nodes, called hubs, are important components of a terrorist network," (p. 137).

42 Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7.

43 Ibid., 8.

44 Ibid.

religious schools, mosques, and sects all over the world in which to root itself.”⁴⁵ His approach will be central to the analysis of the findings of the case studies, thus exploring the (un)charted influence and dynamics of transnational advocacy. Tarrow’s approach will also be implemented in combination with Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang model.

Here, I suggest a slightly different approach when operationalizing the role of ITAN. While Tarrow views these institutions as conduits of rapid cross-border diffusion of domestic contention, I want to turn this notion around and analyze the effects of these transnational advocacy networks on the local populace and domestic actors.

In this respect, transnational advocacy networks (TAN) are defined as follows: “A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”⁴⁶ Keck and Sikkink, point out that the difference between SM and TAN is the social networks, as “TAN are connective structures that cross national boundaries, whereas social networks are the bases for contentious politics within domestic societies.”⁴⁷

Also “TAN lack the drama, the deliberate contentiousness, and the broad goals of such transnational movements as ... fundamental Islam.”⁴⁸ Therefore, through the case studies the thesis will test whether the spread of TAN as faith-based foundations represents the fore post for the spread of radical Islam as a social movement, and whether Islamic revival is part of the same process. In addition to Tarrow, Keck and Sikkink looked at the networking and “their boomerang effect” through its positive impacts. In this respect I will use the following conclusions they came up with:⁴⁹ the role in “the socialization of new movements within national states” and that TAN resemble SM in their attempts to both place new issues on the agenda and make them resonant with indigenous cultural understanding.

45 Tarrow, 8.

46 Tarrow, 7.

47 Ibid., 188.

48 Ibid., 189.

49 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders, Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) as quoted in Tarrow, 189.

In the case of the Balkans, the problem identified with TAN (unlike domestic movements different parts of TAN need to appeal to belief systems, life worlds, and stories, myths and folk tales in many different countries and cultures) seems to actually be a common theme and base for infiltration for the faith-based TAN. In addition, the exchange of information and services also includes influence and impact of edic ideas and individuals.

E. PLAN OF THE STUDY

Chapters II and III operationalize the observed Islamic revival respectively in Bosnia and Bulgaria. I first provide an historical and social account of the evolution of the Islamic religion in these Balkan states. Furthermore, a static approach based on the manifestations of the Islamic revival is used in order to evaluate the scope and character of the current phenomenon. Once the parameters of the latter are established, I then embark on identifying the changes in the social relations and practices in the Muslim communities in the target states. In this respect, these chapters will test the first and the second of the working hypotheses. In addition, both case studies will provide the necessary background for the implementation of the analytical model in order to test the third working hypothesis that addresses the possible structural and ideological link between IR and GSJ.

Chapter IV tests the analytical model against the findings of the case studies. In addition, it contends to establish the differences and similarities between Bosnia and Bulgaria in regard to the researched phenomena.

In Chapter V, I review the findings of the study and assess the validity of alternative hypotheses. In this regard, chapter V discusses possible security and policy implications and initiative, both at the national and regional level that derive from the findings of this study. I also highlight several indications and warning factors that may provide for future security considerations. Finally, the chapter points to several areas of further inquiry that may broaden the understanding of Islamic revival in the context of GSJ.

II. CASE STUDY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A. ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE BALKANS – HISTORIC RETROSPECTIVE

In this chapter, I first use a static approach and outline the current scope and manifestations of the observed Islamic revival. This revival is the spread of the institutions of Islam as general, such as mosques, Islamic relief foundations, charities and NGOs, religious schools, Islamic books, brochures, and tapes publishing, as well as the growth of religiosity in society as a whole.

The comparative historic analysis allows me to test the first hypothesis dealing with the sources and agents of the IR in Bosnia. I show that (a) the process of Islamic revival had not started in the early 1990s – on the contrary, it has its roots in the beginning of the twentieth century and, though it was spurred mainly by the Serbo-Croatian threat perception, from the outset it had been unique to the emic (internal) phenomenon of the Balkans that is inseparable from the building of Bosnian national identity; (b) the Islamists “hijacked” the Islamic revival in the beginning of 1990 while the real driving force behind it in the 1960s and 1970s had been the Sufi orders and traditional *ulema*; (c) though empirically it seems that the same process of Islamic revival received a “second wind” in the 1990s, I would argue that the organizational agents, structures and sources of *the revival* had shifted once the goals of the emic revival were achieved through the formation of Bosnian state and nation, and now the current manifestations of the phenomena emanate from external and/or transnational sources.

In the second section of this chapter I build upon the presented findings in the first section and embark on verifying the second hypothesis by testing whether the observed IR is in an initial phase and/or has advanced to have the characteristics of an emerging social movement. The thesis posits that, while the current evidence is insufficient to confirm the hypothesis, the social appropriation of the radical Salafi ideas and the existence of powerful cultural mobilization frames transformed Bosnia into a contested ground between the foreign religious organizations and the incumbent IC. Finally, I argue that the evolution of the local youth organizations against such a background has the

potential of evolving into powerful social movements on the ground tied to the issue of renewed nationalism, refugee return and current governmental policy inadequacies.

1. Religion, Ethnicity and Nationhood – The Making of a Muslim State in Bosnia

The Balkans are home to over six million Muslims—making up 70 percent of Albania's population, 40 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's, 17 percent of Macedonia's, and 19 percent of Serbia and Montenegro's.⁵⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina marks the Western expansion of the boundaries of the Muslim world. In contrast to Western Europe, the Muslim population is largely indigenous. The Bosnians converted to Islam in the middle of the fifteenth century en masse, the only example of a near-total acceptance of the Muslim religion in the Balkans. Though there have been several explanations of it, it seems the most valid one is that the Christian religion had not caught with the local populace due to the strong Bogomil movement in the twelfth century.⁵¹ In terms of religious practices, Bosnia adopted the predominant in the Turkish Empire Hanafi *madhab* of Islam.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory is divided into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS), with a separate administrative district in Brcko. Bosnia has an area of 19,781 square miles. In June 2004, the State Agency for Statistics estimated that the population was around 3.8 million,⁵² although a reliable census has not been conducted since 1991. Relevant statistics on the precise membership of different religious groups remain unavailable.

According to the U.N. Development Program's Human Development Report in 2002 cited by the US Department of State,⁵³ Muslims constitute 40 percent of the

⁵⁰ All percentages derived from the Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook 2005*, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁵¹ Long disputed over by its ring of more powerful neighbours, Bosnia was not yet firmly integrated into any ecclesiastical body when the Bogomil movement was expelled from Byzantium and Bulgaria, and then spread westwards. Bosnia became under its bans (rulers alike kings) a refuge for persecuted heretics. Ban Kulin (c. 1180-1204) and his successors all appear to have been favorable to, or at least tolerant of, this popular movement. For more, see *The Balkan Slavs: Bosnia and the Bogimil Heresy*, http://www.serbianna.com/features/entry_of_slavs/bosnia.shtml, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁵² *Statistical Bulletin 4*, Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.bhas.ba/pdf%20i%20zip/pdf/Bil4_04.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁵³ *Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Religious Freedom Report 2005*, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51544.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

population, Serb Orthodox 31 percent, Roman Catholics 15 percent, Protestants 4 percent, and other groups 10 percent. The small Jewish community has approximately 1,000 believers and maintains a special place in society by virtue of its long history of coexistence with other religious communities and its active role in mediating among those communities.

The evolution of a national identity in Bosnia shares many common traits with that of Serbs and Croats, but as Velikonja (2003) pointed out, “it is distinguished from them by the significance of the religious [Muslim] factor.”⁵⁴

Thus, it is imperative to view the process of Islamic revival in the context of a historical evolution and building of Bosnian Muslim national identity. Thus, the thesis offers a somewhat artificial periodization of Bosnian history into the pre-1991 era (before the collapse of Yugoslavia), and post-1991 period with an emphasis on the 1991-1995 war and its consequences.

There are several characteristics of the evolution of Islam in Bosnia in this period. First, for the past 150 years, Bosnian Muslim national identity was forged within a framework which highlighted foreign threats in the context of the hostile environment imposed by the neighboring Croats and Serbs. Second, there had been up until 1991 a tenuous link between the *reis-ul-ulementa* and other authorities and the genuine religious leaders. Finally, there has been an Islamic revival within the mainstream of “folk Hanafi Islam” that, nevertheless, has to be viewed in the ethnic-nationalistic framework that led to the affirmation of Bosnian nationality against the competing Serbian and Croatian churches.

The framing of a foreign threat is important to understanding the development of a Muslim identity in Bosnia. A multi-religious mix of the country added an important and particular factor to the history of the identity in the country.⁵⁵ Though both Serbian and Croatian ethno-religious extremism and national policy did not support Bosnian national self-affirmation until the late 1960s,⁵⁶ the breaking point for the Muslims in ex-

⁵⁴ Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 19.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 20.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Yugoslavia was 1971, when the then national census offered them the opportunity to declare themselves Muslim in the national sense. Thus, this confusion made many believe that Islam was a nationality or a nation.

Nevertheless, while Serbian and Croatian churches were taking advantage of the liberalization of the communist methods and expanding their resources, a Muslim religious organization had not been established as a guardian of national identity.⁵⁷ After World War II (WWII), the Muslim religious organization (the Islamic religious community, later renamed into Islamic Community) rebuilt itself in socialist Yugoslavia. As Perica pointed out, in the early 1980s the Islamic community (IC)⁵⁸ was an organization of Muslim clerical and lay officials headquartered in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵⁹ During the communist era, the unified Muslim religious organization was established in all six Yugoslav Republics and two provinces. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Muslim religious organization was abolished and the autonomous Islamic Community of Bosnia was founded in Sarajevo.

Central to the purpose of this thesis is the development, dynamic and emerging frictions within the Muslim community in Bosnia after February 1968 when the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared Bosnian Muslims, as well as other Yugoslav Muslims who thought of themselves as a distinct nationality, a full-fledged nationality recognized by the federal constitution.

Thus, here I argue that before 1991 there was a genuine Islamic revival in Bosnia which was promoted and had as its organizational agents the IC, which provided the institutional framework, the Sufi orders that commanded traditional support mainly in the countryside (from below, bottom-up), and the extreme Young Muslim group (led by Alija Izetbegovic) which professed mainly Islamist ideas but had until 1991 constituted only an intellectual minority (from above, top-down). The roots of such a revival can be found in the 1920s, though it was stalled for couple of decades with the institutionalizing of communism in the Yugoslavia after WWII.

⁵⁷ Vjekoslav Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 74.

⁵⁸ The native Bosnian term *Islamska Zajednica* and Islamic Community are used interchangeably in the thesis.

⁵⁹ Perica, 11.

Importantly, Bosnian Muslims throughout the twentieth century have not been cut off from the great changes that swept over the greater Islamic world. Even in the beginning of the twenty-first century in the case of the Muslim population of contemporary Bosnia, it can be seen what Tarrow (1998) terms as “cross-border diffusion—the communication of movement ideas, forms of organization, or challenges to similar targets from one center of contention [Egypt] to another.”⁶⁰ Still, these ideas seemed to catch up more with the traditional ulema than the leadership of the IZ. Since the “proclamation” of the new nation there has been friction between Muslims who stressed ethnicity and modern secular national identity, and Muslims who considered religion the key ingredient of ethnic nationalism.⁶¹ The former was emphasized by the IZ while the latter by the outlawed Young Muslims. Such a controversy led to the change of IZ head in 1989 and in the formation of Izetbegovich’s party SDA (Party of Democratic Action) on May 26, 1990.⁶² In addition, as I will show in section two, these fissures proved to be crucial in the emergence of extreme interpretations (as Wahhabism) of Islam in the mid-1990s along with the predominantly Hanafi (folk) Islamic tradition.

IZ had been the closest supporter of the regime’s official ideology of “brotherhood and unity” and was instrumental in backing the Titoist foreign policy of non-alignment. Such support played a crucial role in the rebuilding and expansion of Islam in the 1960s and 1970s when the Yugoslav government embarked on liberal reforms. The figures are illustrative. Between 1969 and 1980, more than 800 Muslim places of worship had been built, and the IZ operated over 3,000 mosques in early 1980.⁶³ In the first half of the 1980s, IZ had 1,600 officials – imams, hafezs (reciters of the Qur’an), religious instructors and other employees.⁶⁴ In addition, the Muslim religious organization had the most favorable cleric-per-believer ratio among the three major religions in Yugoslavia – one imam for every 1,250 Muslims. The IZ had not been enjoying only state support but abundant financing from Islamic countries. While the

⁶⁰ Tarrow, 186.

⁶¹ Perica, 76.

⁶² Ibid., 87.

⁶³ Radovan Samardzic, *Religious Communities in Yugoslavia*, (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1981), 39.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

extreme elements (such as Hasan Cengic – a close fellow to Izetbegovic) were contained during this period, some of them were able to voice their complaints that “Islam was suppressed in Yugoslavia.”⁶⁵ According to Kepel, between the 1970s and the 1990s, Islamists remained an intellectual minority.⁶⁶ He explained this phenomenon in using the framework of resource mobilization theory and arguing that there was no other social groups liable to join it to resemble a movement like the ones in Egypt, Pakistan, or Malaysia, and there was no devout middle class nor an impoverished urban youth with the potential to unite.⁶⁷ Still, my argument here is that the Islamists “hijacked” the Islamic revival in the beginning of 1990 while the real driving force behind such a revival in the 1960s and 1970s had been the Sufi orders and traditional ulema.

Historically, Sufi orders played an important role in the islamisation of Bosnia, the Osmanli military, and revolts against the Osmanli state. Sufis were successful propagators of Islam due to their accommodation of some local customs and practices. The IC put a ban on the tariqas in 1952⁶⁸ and it was not until 1990 when the situation started to improve. Nevertheless, it did not mean that the Sufi orders stopped their activity. Their main concentration is in Central Bosnia (Travnik, Foijnica, Kiseljak, Visoko, Zenica, and Sarajevo) and their actions soon accounted for the reinforcement of the traditional fissures between the urban and rural elites in Bosnia. On the other hand, the growing numbers of youths sent to the Arab states for the purpose of religious education upon return either joined Izetbegovic’s side or veered towards the anti-communist clergy. In this respect, Sadowski showed that the “traditionalism” as a variety of political Islam caught up with the rural elites while reformism was in the realm of senior ulema and the nontraditional urban elites. Ahmet Alibasi⁶⁹ confirmed these fissures. In his working paper, he showed that Bosnians accepted Islam on “the hands of the Osmanli ‘ulama and Sufis and therefore adopted the dominant legal and theological

⁶⁵ Perica, 79.

⁶⁶ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 244.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Alibasi, 10.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 3.

schools in the state, Hanafi madhab in law and *Maturidi* school⁷⁰ of thought in theology. The position of these two schools remained practically unchallenged until the recent internecine conflict in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. The exception is modernism which was quite strong during 1960s and 1970s. However, it was confined to small Islamic intellectual circles in Sarajevo, a few Islamic publications and the classrooms of the Faculty of Islamic studies without stronger roots in Muslim population.”⁷¹

These divisions came forward with the death of Tito that led to a backlash against Izetbegovic in the infamous trial of 1983, when he and his supporter were sentenced to a combined total of 90 years in jail. Such an act of political repression, due mainly to the Serbian fears of the increased Islamic revival, ensued further discrediting of the IZ⁷² as the authorities tried to involve them in the political struggles, raised the profile of Bosnian Islam in the Arab and Iranian media, and led to the growing popularity of Izetbegovic and his increasing influence among the Bosnian Muslim Clergy. It was only a question of time when it would throw its lot with him. Such a time came in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s when Serbian and Croatian ethnic nationalist movements swamped Yugoslavia, i.e. in the face of the internal and external threat. Both the magazine “Economist” and Sadowski reported of the increased intolerance to the IZ that led to the election in March 1991 of “the first democratically elected reis ul-ulema, Jakub Selimoski.”⁷³

Traditionalist Islam enjoyed a brief resurgence in Bosnia in the late 1980. In 1988 about 500 of Bosnia’s 3000 imams gathered in Tuzla to lament the decay of morality and call for the reintroduction of traditional Islamic codes regarding schools, the role of women, and other practices. But the Imam’s movement, and Bosnian traditionalist generally, lacked the resources and organizational skills to form a durable political force....The senior ulama in Bosnia have been surprisingly progressive. While some are moderately conservative, most subscribe to reformism, the fourth

70 In Islam, a Maturidi (Arabic: *ماتريدی*) is one who follows Abu Mansur Al Maturidi's theology, which is a close variant of the Ash'ari school of thought and the codifying of the beliefs of traditional Sunni Islam as practiced since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. This theology is popular where the Hanafi school of law is followed, viz. in Turkey, Central Asia, Pakistan and India. For more information see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maturidi>.

71 Alibasi, 3.

72 IZ – Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community) is used interchangeably with its equivalent in English IC throughout the thesis.

73 Perica, 85.

variety of political Islam....Instead of advocating an Islamic state, the Declaration [the Islamic Declaration – 1970 paper written by Alija Izetbegovic arguing that ‘the Islamic order can be realized only in those countries in which Muslims represent the majority of the population. Without this majority, the Islamic system is reduced only to naked power (because the second element, the Islamic society, is missing and may turn into tyranny’] calls for the creation of a new Islamic intelligentsia who will inspire a cultural renaissance.⁷⁴

Thus, as Kepel pointed out, pan-Islamism as a form of transnational social movement (TSM) gained considerable roots in Bosnia despite the fact that Young Muslims (whose member was Alija Izetbegovic) were dismantled by Tito in 1949.⁷⁵

2. Religion as a Hallmark of a Nation - 1991-1995 War and the Contemporary Islamic Revival

This Islamic revival underwent radical qualitative and quantitative changes from the beginning of the war in Bosnia in 1992. Before the start of the war, IZ had already embarked on becoming another Yugoslav ‘national church’ dedicated to the making of a Bosniak nation. Apart from IZ, the party created by Alija Izetbegovic provided another organizational structure for gathering popular support for the Islamic cause, both abroad and in the country. According to some sources, the sole ascension of SDA to power was due to its alliance with five hundred imams. As Perica pointed out, despite the IZ’s efforts to comply with the decision on the political neutrality of IC, “many clerics virtually remained party activists without a membership card.”⁷⁶ The emerging political opportunity of carving up an Islamic state was grasped by Izetbegovic and the other hawks in SDA. Their growing power led to a coup in IZ which overthrew Selimoski as a mufti and installed Mustafa Ceric as reis-ulema. These factors paved the way for the arrival of the aid agencies and mujahidin in Bosnia. Here, I will explore the impact of their activity during and after the war only in terms of testing H1 and H2, while the issue of the link between Islamic revival and GSJ will be explored in Chapter IV.

Left with utmost freedom of operation, the aid agencies and the mujaheddin were catalysts for the post-1991 process of Islamic revival due to the fact that in themselves they were new aggressive organizational and social agents of radical Salafi Islam that

⁷⁴ Perica, 12-13.

⁷⁵ Kepel, 239.

⁷⁶ Perica, 142, n. 49.

readily fit into the bigger framework of Sufi-led revivalism. In addition, several other factors, as discussed below, facilitated their influence, such as the increased relations between Bosnia and the Muslim world due to the financial and political isolation in which the emerging Bosnian state was subjected to in the initial stages of the war, the transmission of radical ideas through the Bosnian religious students in the ME, and the proliferation of Arab literature, media and cultural invasion.

The result was the materialization of radical Salafi mainstream parallel to Hanafi (traditional folk) Bosnian Islam, the emergence of local radical youth organizations like AIY and Supporters of Shariah, and the acquisition of foreign waqfs by the Saudis. All of the above led to indirect contention of the constitutional authority of IZ as the sole representative of the Bosnian Muslims granted by the constitution of 1997.

a. “Secular State and Non-Secular Society”⁷⁷ – SDA and/or Islamism (Political Opportunity, Cross Border Diffusion and Transnational Political Exchange)

A conceptualization of developments in the 1990s in Bosnia inevitably entails close examination of the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcie - Party of Democratic Action). The SDA political hegemony, platform and influence in the society can be interpreted in several ways. Definitely one might argue that it provided a political space and opportunity for the proselytisation of radical Islam in Bosnia. In this respect, the authority, moral and social credit endowed to Alija Izetbegović can be deemed as a vital pre-condition for the emergence of Islamism. Indeed, the sole establishment and survival of the country was based on the reification and resurrection of the Islamic identity which was tied irreversibly with the Bošniak nation. In addition, in the early years of the war (1992-1995), Izetbegović and Party leadership were advocating a “secular state and non-secular” society. As Lederer (2001) pointed out, “the ruling Party has had a pronounced Islamic orientation and the symbiosis of ethnic and national identities, ideology and power, Party and state, allowed it to extend its control over the population, which voted for it massively at several elections.”⁷⁸ Nevertheless, Islamism in this respect did not

⁷⁷ Excerpts of the Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegovic are available at <http://www.balkanpeace.org/cib/bos/bosi/bosi01.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁷⁸ Gyorgy Lederer, “Islam in East Europe,” *Central Asian Survey*, 20, no. 1 (March 2001), p. 9. <http://docserver.ingentaconnect.com/deliver/cw/routledg/02634937/v20n1/s1/p5.pdf?fmt=dirpdf&tt=343&cl=19&ini=&bini=&wis=&ac=0&acs=90107782&expires=1142299193&checksum=CC7410EAA257D63A4D7C355A2D3C86D3&cookie=1137556992>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

amount to a broadly based social movement. One possible reason is that it was mainly an elitist phenomenon and there was a political consensus in the country. There were no viable contention issues rather than the war that could emulate into strong Islamic social movement. The sheer fact that SDA was using Islamic authority could pass as a political opportunity, but it actually diffused any possible flames that could have spurred collective action against the government. External factors and the political isolation of the emerging state were important to cross-border diffusion⁷⁹ and transnational political exchange,⁸⁰ mainly with Iran and Saudi Arabia. For a long time, the Bosnian president pleaded for international intervention. Yet neither the United States nor the European Union was ready to go to war for the state they had recognized. Izetbegovic turned increasingly to Islamic states, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, for assistance.

These states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Iran, have been an object of scholarly interest since the 1990s, primarily in the realm of financing terrorism. Here, my goal is quite different – to analyze their long term policy of proselytisation of Shia and Wahabbi Islam as a catalyzing factor in shifting the nature of the contemporary Islamic revival in Bosnia. The momentum their influence gained still has effects on the Bosnian Muslim society currently.

(1) Iran. Iranian influence was more at the political, military and governmental level which opened the way for the transfer of 3,000 to 5,000 mujahedeens, arms and supplies for the Bosnian army.

President Clinton secretly gave a green light to covert Iranian arms shipments into Bosnia in 1994 despite a United Nations arms embargo that the United States was pledged to uphold and the Administration's own policy of isolating Tehran globally as a supporter of terrorism, according to senior Administration officials and other sources. Two top U.S. diplomats, acting on instructions from the White House and the State Department, told Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in early 1994 that the

79 As defined by Tarrow, cross-border diffusion is “the communication of movement ideas, forms of organization, or challengers to similar targets from one center of contention to another.” (p. 186).

80 As defined by Tarrow, transnational political exchange refers to “temporary forms of cooperation among essentially national actors that identify a common interest or set of values in a particular political configuration” (p. 187).

United States would not object to the creation of an arms pipeline that would channel the weapons through Croatia and into Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸¹

American decision further facilitated Iranian penetration in the region. As a CIA officer told Congress in a classified deposition in 1996 cited by Loretta Napoleoni (2003), “There was no question that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great assistance in allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the Bosnian government.”⁸² Iran's influence is not only limited to Iranians coming to Bosnia. The New York Times on March 3, 1996 quoted a senior European military officer who suggested that ideological indoctrination represented an even bigger threat to the West than the technical training those troops received. According to Napoleoni, Saudi Arabia and Iran were able to convince the U.S. that they were backing its plan to redraw the map of the country while “secretly having their own agenda ‘to spread Islamic colonization in the region.’”⁸³

(2) Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government actively used financial means and diplomatic ties with the emerging Bosnian state in order to launch a sustained aid effort, which after the war evolved in open promotion of Islamic revival through Wahhabi Islam.

During the war, King Fahd held regular meetings with President Izetbegovic to coordinate both diplomatic and military efforts. To provide direct relief for the Bosnian Muslims, the Government of Saudi Arabia immediately launched a sustained aid effort, supplemented by private donations from the Saudi population. In this respect, in May 1992, the Supreme Committee for the Collection of Donations for the Muslims in Bosnia, headed by Prince Salman, the Governor of Riyadh, was set up in the Kingdom as the channel for private donations.⁸⁴ In Bosnia alone, Riyadh has spent over 600 million

81 House Republican Policy Committee, “Policy, Perspective: The Clinton Administration's 'Wink and Nod' to Allow Iran into Bosnia: Iran-Bosnia Credibility Gap”, April 26, 1996, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/hrpc_irancred.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

82 Napoleoni, 114.

83 Ibid., 115.

84 “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz, n.d., <http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/mail/1400.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

on Islamic activities, according to official Saudi sources.⁸⁵ The major distribution system established back in 1992 in fourteen offices in Bosnian cities and towns laid the basis for the influx of relief charities and foundations. In addition, several big foreign *waqfs* were established after 1995 which, by way of contract with the IC, granted full autonomy for various periods of time (usually two decades).⁸⁶

b. *Spread of Islamic ITAN*

This can be best exemplified by the spread of Islamic religious institutions such as mosques, relief foundations, NGOs, charities, which boomed during the 1990s and only started to slow down after 9/11. According to South Eastern Europe (SEE) Security Monitor (02/02/2003), there are more than 250 religious humanitarian organizations in Bosnia emanating from the Middle East and Europe. They have been involved in providing various types of assistance to the needy, particularly the homeless.⁸⁷ There has also been enough evidence that their main purpose has also been the proselytization of Wahhabi Islam and serving as fronts for AQ in the country.⁸⁸

The main supporters of salafi ideas were the following relief agencies: High Saudi Committee, Al-Haramain Foundation, and the Society for the Revival of Islamic Heritage (Jam'iyyat Ihya' al-Turah al-Islami). Among Bosnian organizations there are Active Islamic Youth (AIY), Furqan (closed down on December 31, 2002), Balkan Center u Zenici (for a short period), and Centre for the Affirmation of Islamic Sciences. The influence of these charities has been growing as the Reisu-l-ulema of Bosnia Mustafa Cengic pointed out in an interview in 2002: "Without them we could not survive."⁸⁹

The Saudi government's involvement in financing and proselytisation of Wahhabi Islam can be exemplified by the activity and resiliency of the Al-Haramain

⁸⁵ Alex Alexiev, "The Missing Link in the War on Terror: Confronting Saudi Subversion," *Center for Security Policy*, 2002, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=static&page=alexiev>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁸⁶ Alibasi, 8.

⁸⁷ United States Institute for Peace, *Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Special report No 103, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr103.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁸⁸ The latter point will be discussed further in Chapter V.

⁸⁹ "Bosnia: Foreign-Funded Mosques under Scrutiny," *Religioscope*, May 10, 2002, http://www.religioscope.com/info/notes/2002_050_islam_bosnia.htm, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

foundation. In reality, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, alongside the World Muslim League, is the Saudi's largest Islamist front organization, controlled directly by the minister of religious affairs Saleh bin Abdul Aziz Al-Ashaikh.⁹⁰ In March 2002, the Saudi government reluctantly agreed to curb donations from the foundation and froze the office in Bosnia.⁹¹ However, in September 2002, the charity opened an Islamic center in Sarajevo that cost \$530,000.⁹² When Al Haramain was ordered to cease its activities, its function was taken over by two other foundations – Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia and Wazir (Wazir).⁹³ The former was founded in 1993 by Saudi Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and has been caring for 500 war orphans and paying the utility bills for many Bosnian families impoverished by the country's 1992-1995 war. Its Sarajevo headquarters cost an estimated \$9 million and includes a massive mosque that accommodates 5,000 people, modern classrooms, a library, restaurants, and a sports hall.⁹⁴ Wazir was based in Travnik and was closed in 2004, two years after Al Haramain assets were allegedly frozen in Bosnia.

In addition, according to estimates by the Islamic Community, 80% of the state's 1,750 mosques were destroyed or damaged during the war. Now 50 to 60 have been rebuilt, both in urban and rural areas, mostly with money provided through the foreign relief foundations. Still, the overall control lies with the IC. In 1999, the IC controlled 946 mosques and 636 *masjids*, while 258 mosques and 112 *masjids* were under construction. The IC employed 1,119 persons as imams, *mu'allims* and *khatibs*.⁹⁵

c. Islamic Education in the Middle East

Besides relief agencies and *mujahidun*, another in the long range and perhaps the most important vehicle for the transmission of reformist ideas from the Middle East to Bosnia are students. Again, Alibasi (2003) provided the most relevant

⁹⁰ Alexiev (2002); and Napoleoni, 115.

⁹¹ "US, Saudi to Freeze Charity Assets," *Muslim American Society*, January 22, 2004 <http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=857>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁹² Napoleoni, 115.

⁹³ "US, Saudi to Freeze Charity Assets."

⁹⁴ Brian Whitmore, "Saudi 'Charity' Troubles Bosniaks," *Bosnian Report* 29-31, June-November 2002, http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleid=886&reportid=155, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

⁹⁵ Alibasi, 7, n. 12.

data in this regard. Today, the number of Bosnian graduates of Islamic studies outside the country equals the number of graduates from the Faculty of Islamic Studies. At the moment (2004), there are about a hundred Bosnian students of Islam in Saudi Arabia, about 60 in Syria, 40 in Egypt, 35 in Jordan, 30 in Iran, 10 in Pakistan, 10 in Turkey, and about 20 in Malaysia. Although many of these students adopt salafi ideas, others do not, and they easily find their place in the IC upon return to the country.⁹⁶ I will further elaborate on the tensions between IC and the Sufi institutions, but now it is enough to just outline that the IC today employs some 15 Ph. D. holders, an equal number of MA holders, and over 500 graduates from different Islamic and secular faculties in and outside the country. Its educational system consists of six *madrasas* in Bosnia and two in Zagreb (Croatia) and Novi Pazar (Sandžak, Serbia) with some 1300 pupils, the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and three academies for teacher training (Zenica, Bosnia and N. Pazar) with some 800 students. In addition, the IC has a 460 year-old library, the publishing center named El-Kalem, the Center for Islamic Architecture, the News Agency MINA, Office for Diaspora, and Directorate of *Waqfs*.

As of today, Islamic education is provided in 1,405 *maktabs* (elementary informal religious schools) for 60,000 regular pupils, 13 Islamic high schools (*madrasa*), two Islamic academies for training teachers of religious education in state schools, and the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. These, however, are not the only institutions where Bosnians acquire Islamic knowledge. Hundreds of Bosnians are currently enrolled at various universities throughout the (mainly Muslim) world. In addition, the IC employs as religious leaders (*imams*) many graduates from non-Islamic universities.

d. Islamic Revival through the Spread of Islamic Culture

In addition, Bosnia after 1992 was flooded with all kinds of Islamic ideas and literature. Again, there are clear indications about the underlying contention for influence between the IC and pro-salafi organizations. The IC and its institutions publish several fortnight newspapers and journals. The most widely circulated are the fortnightly “Preporod” (print run of 19,000 copies) and the educational journal “Novi muallim” (2,800 copies), while the oldest is the official herald of the IC, the bimonthly “Glasnik.” The monthly “Islamska misao” has not been published since 1992. Now, the second most

⁹⁶ Alibasi, 14.

widely read Islamic magazine (fortnightly) is “Saff,” published by pro-Salafi AIY (9,000 copies per issue). The tone of the articles in the magazine is much more moderate than the discourse of some members of the organization itself. Another important magazine is the monthly “Novi horizonti.”⁹⁷

In terms of the influence that external ‘authorities’ are having on the traditional forms of Islam and on the further promotion of the Salafist ideas, it is worth making a comparative analysis of some of the web sites that are supported by the IC and the Salafists. The Rijaset offers, as much as the one based in Sarajevo IslamBosna.com, advice and interpretative information from religious authorities. Both sites are focusing on the diaspora, despite the fact that the latter is dominated by Sayyid Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁸ Supporters of the Shariah website are in sharp contrast with the ones that traditionally profess folk Islam. It is not much different from the rest of the Salafist websites.

B. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

The historic retrospective lays the groundwork for testing my hypothesis, which would allow for an operationalization of the current Islamic Revival in the Balkans and answer the stated research question. In this section, I test H1 and H2 against the findings of the Bosnian case study.

1. H1: The Process of Islamic Revival is Mainly an Imported (edificatory) Phenomenon

Usually the process of revival is a mix of local and imported factors. Nevertheless, my principal argument is that, despite the fact that prewar turmoil, war and genocide facilitated the process of the “nationalization” of Islam, the current Islamic revival has deviated from its projected development defined by the events in the 1970s and 1980s. The influx of external agents between 1992 and 1995 not only turned the heartland of Bosnia into “another Mecca,”⁹⁹ but it also reshaped the then ethno-nationalistic-religious revival and added to it a more extreme Salafi element to it. Though most of these agents were flushed out of the country after the war, the created social and

⁹⁷ Alibasi, 18.

⁹⁸ Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad Online Fatwas, and Cyber Islamic Environment*, (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 162.

⁹⁹ Perica, 168.

financial networks on the ground have been continually sustaining the phenomena. This has been done mainly through the local youth organizations that the radical Salafi elements helped create, or through evading the security state measures and maintaining agents' physical presence in the state.

It is not a surprise that these agents fit into the Sufi dominated orders in central Bosnia. Though it is arguable whether they were inspired by the Salafi ideas, it is a fact that through their activity in the 1970s and 1980s the Sufi orders provided a permissive environment for the emergence of Salafi offshoot of Islam in parallel to the traditional Hanafi Islam.

As Perica (2003) specified, in 1995 more than 190 various Islamic organizations (including branches of the militant Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Taliban) operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Certainly, as Evan Kohlmann (2004) certified, most of the relief agencies such as TWRA, BIF, Al-Muwafaq, etc. were used as fronts for financing mujahedins. The latter, soon after the commencement of the war, started using Bosnia as "the springboard for a greater and more expansive international 'holy struggle'."¹⁰⁰ However, it is also evident that these agents were heavily involved in proselytizing radical Salafi Islam. This activity did not stop with the signing of the Dayton accords. On the contrary, most Islamic fighters remained in the country through marrying local women or under the provision of the former Citizenship Law that made it possible for the foreign members of the Army of Bosnia to obtain citizenship. The glaring example of such a preaching activity is Imad el-Misri, who was arrested on July 18, 2001 and later, on October 1, 2001, deported to Egypt. According to one of the emic reports provided by Esad Hecimovic, after eight years of constant activity in central Bosnia and in the region of Sarajevo, the number of el-Misri's followers is estimated to be in the hundreds, perhaps even thousands.¹⁰¹ His activity did not recede after the war, as between 1992 and 1995, more than 2000 Bosniaks went through a forty-day religious training led by el-Misri, which is a precondition for the admittance into the El-Mujahid brigade. According

¹⁰⁰ Evan F. Kohlmann, *Al-Qaeda's Jihad in Europe: The Afghan Bosnian Network* (Oxford, New York: Berg Publishers, 2004) 44-46, 75.

¹⁰¹ Esad Hecimovic, "Is Bosnia a Safe Heaven for Terrorists?" *Global Vision News Network*, 2001, <http://www.gvnews.net/html/WorldReacts/alert34.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

to his supporters, el-Misri supervised nineteen training sessions during the war, and six after the war. He also held numerous lectures on behalf of the Active Islamic Youth,¹⁰² an organization recruiting young Bosniak Muslims.

Aid agencies and NGOs still have high profiles in the country. The NGOs evolved into local branches or closed and opened new offices under other names (the above example of al-Haramain is prevalent). While the former helped during the war to intensify the Islamic revival of the 1970s and 1980s and “revive the *jihadi* spirit,”¹⁰³ after 1995, along with the Bosnians, they opened Islamic kindergartens, *halal* food restaurants and meat shops.

Several authors ignore this contextual change in the general trends of Islamic revival and the emergence of a more radical one through the active support of these external agents. According to Alibasic, Perica and Schwarz, for example, “the attempted Islamic revolution lost momentum”¹⁰⁴ and “things are going back to normal.”¹⁰⁵ Though they admit that Islamic radicalism and Muslim nationalism have not been completely defeated, they put forward the argument that a large portion of the Bosnian population (a large number of urban Muslims) has chosen democracy, secularism and new Europe.¹⁰⁶ Apart from the issue of whether Europe is ready to accept them, as discussed in Chapter V, my argument is that (a) such findings do not necessarily incorporate into their analysis the situation in the rural areas, (b) they are not taking into account the continual existence and operation of the same agents that spurred Salafism in the first place and (c) they necessarily adopt a structuralist approach that depicts the Islamic revival in the state as necessarily supported and promoted by the ruling political elite, and, thus, the removal of the latter as a necessary and sufficient condition for curbing and dissolving radical Islamic revival in the country.

102 AIY will be discussed in the next session.

103 Alibasi, 13.

104 Perica, 171.

105 Alibasic, 13.

106 For further discussion of this choice, see Perica, 171; and Stephen Schwarz, “What Defines Moderate Islam,” *FrontPage.com Central Station*, November 17, 2004, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15993>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

Such arguments do not take into account the social dynamics and the changes in social terrain in certain areas of the country and ignore the continual external support for such an activity. Instead, I argue that the original Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and 1980s waned as the new Bosnian state was created after the war. This original Islamic revivalism took another direction toward propagation of more radical ideas. Such radical Islamic revival is an imported phenomenon and the following factors account for both its sustenance and manifestations:

- Financial backings coming from the Arab states.
- Ideological influence through the educated in the Middle East Islamic students.
- Continual existence and activity of Islamic ITAN on the ground.

Saudi influence and financial support have been materialized through the establishment of several big (multi-million) foreign *waqfs* after 1995. There are several centers whose primary purpose is the proselytisation of Wahhabi Islam – the Cultural Center King Fahd (CCKF) in Sarajevo, the Cultural center in Hadzici near Sarajevo, the Saudi cultural center in central Bosnian town of Bogojno, etc. Until several years ago, the High Saudi Commission for the Relief of Bosnian Muslims (HSC) had administered CCKF without even consulting with the IC.¹⁰⁷ HSC also gave full support to support local Salafi organizations such as AIY and Furqan. Though Furqan was dissolved in 2002, the link between the former and HSC is not severed. In addition, in his recent report at Berkeley, Ahmet Alibasi (2005) pointed out that “we see again mosques, and other Islamic institutions (re)built by foreign Muslims, which has not been the case for over a century. Today Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Indonesia, etc. have mosques after their names in Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.”¹⁰⁸

In addition, according to the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor:

¹⁰⁷ Alibasi, 8.

¹⁰⁸ Ahmet Alibasic, “Globalization and Its Impact on Bosnian Muslim Practices,” (working paper, Center on Institutions and Governance, University of California, Berkeley, 2005) <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=igs>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

There are also foreign missionaries who preach fundamentalist forms of Islam that tend to be intolerant of other religions and other forms of Islam. There are some reports that Muslims have been offered economic incentives to worship and/or dress in a way that is different from traditional Bosnian Muslim custom.Religious leaders from the Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox communities claim that all forms of observance are increasing among young people as an expression of increased identification with their ethnic heritage, in large part due to the national religious revival that occurred as a result of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Leaders from the three main religious communities observed that they enjoy greater support from their believers in rural areas of Bosnia than from those in urban centers such as Sarajevo or Banja Luka.¹⁰⁹

Further, the trends outlined in the 1990s intensified in the new century. Both reports by Alibasic of 2002 and 2005 confirmed that the number of Bosnian graduates of Islamic studies outside Bosnia equals the number of graduates from the Faculty of Islamic Studies. At the moment, there are about 100 Bosnian students of Islam in SA, 60 in Syria, 40 in Egypt, 35 in Jordan, 30 in Iran, 10 in Pakistan, 10 in Turkey, and about 20 in Malaysia. As attested by recent surveys,¹¹⁰ this exchange of ideas has led to the projection, ideological and physical, of every group in the Muslim world into the social terrain of Bosnia.

In essence, such an activity supports my third argument about the increase of transnational networks and exchanges of all kinds. “We are witnessing the coming (back) of transnational Islam to Bosnia: ideas, resources, movements, Islamic centers, networks, schools, and even cadres. As a result we today in Bosnia have almost every Islamic group (and religious practice associated with them) represented from the followers of Nursi to salafis, to revivalist, and even Abu Hamza’s group, at least on the Internet.”¹¹¹

This estimate still poses a legitimate question about the sources of such an Islamic revival. If all these organizational agents are seen on the ground, how can one be sure that it is still an imported phenomenon rather than one that is defined and spurred by the indigenous Bosnian Islamic organizations?

109 *Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Religious Freedom Report 2005*.

110 Alibasic, “Globalization and Its Impact.”

111 Ibid., 5.

The answer to this question is not straightforward and calls for testing the second suggested hypothesis. Here, I would reiterate that the current Islamic revival is mainly foreign rather than a locally driven phenomenon. First of all, despite the increase in the proliferation of ideas, finances, Islamic organizations and ITAN, still the majority of the local population is adherent to the folk Hanafi Islam despite some “universal changes in practices.”¹¹²

Second, such a revival is not sustainable by local Muslim thoughts or available financial sources. Without the latter it would not be able to persist on the ground. In reference to the former, except for the apologetic work “Islam between East and West” by the late Alija Izetbegovic, today “it remains the only text written by a Bosnian Muslim that is cited by Muslims in the central Muslim lands.”¹¹³

Often the proliferation of NGOs and charities as part of the Islamic ITAN has been cited as an indication of social dynamics on the ground. In this respect, in order to test the viability of such local organizations that are rivaling IC for influence over the Bosnian Muslims, I suggest that such a proposition be tested against the Boomerang model suggested by Sikkink and Kick.

Sikkink and Kick plumb international relations, social movement, network and other theories to come up with their major model. As I already indicated, after the shift of authority towards a more moderate and European oriented course and the institutionalization of the IC as the sole representative of the Umma, one should expect the Boomerang model to be well at work. Essentially it presupposes local NGO initiative surpassing recalcitrant local states, reaching foreign and international NGOs, foreign states and international organizations, so as to ‘boomerang’ back on local ones. Nevertheless, in the case of Bosnia, thus far there have not been any indications of such an activity. On the contrary, one can see the opposite reverse manifestation of the “international demonstration effect” through which not local but rather foreign organizations are trying to garner support through ideological and financial means over the local population and reshape their social agenda.

¹¹² Alibasic, “Globalization and Its Impact.” 4.

¹¹³ Ibid., 3.

Still, such intense networking on the ground by the Islamic ITAN, including the above structural agents as Islamic charities, relief foundations, NGOs and the mosque network, begs further exploration of the possible changes in the social terrain spurred by their activities. Here, the research I have done and the above case study findings show that the end effects are along the spectrum locked between fragmentation/polarization of previously quite uniform Islam and the open contestation of the IC authority as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Mapping the Social Terrain Central Bosnia.

According to Bougarel (2002), in Bosnia, what he terms as re-Islamization led to the transformation of the collective identity of the Islamic Community, without the corresponding modification of the individual behavior of its members.¹¹⁴ His findings that the financial assistance from the Muslim world, despite the short term effect of strengthening the Islamic religious institutions, would eventually destroy their unity and

¹¹⁴ Xavier Bougarel, "How Panislamism Replaced Communism," July 2, 1999, <http://ex-yupress.com/dani/dani10.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

authority were recently backed up by Alibasic's (2005) field study of central Bosnia¹¹⁵. Despite the fact that the latter attributed such developments to the process of deterritorialization, this thesis is more interested into the process analysis of possible social transformation on the ground. In line with the above findings and spread of ITAN, today the IC in Bosnia is forced to compete with new Islamic organizations for the position of the exclusive interpreter of Islam which it enjoyed for last six decades. Many do not feel easy about it and have requested (unsuccessfully) that the state do not license any entity with the word 'Islamic' in its name for example.¹¹⁶

In this regard, it is more than imperative to elaborate on the possibility of any further developments, thus, the testing of the second suggested hypotheses remains crucial for the operationalizing of the Islamic revival in the Balkans, and Bosnia in particular.

2. H2: The Observed Islamic Revival, Depending on the Characteristics of the Social Terrain of Various Balkan States, Constitutes the Initial Phase of the Emergence of Local Islamic Movements

In order to test this hypothesis I will use SMT in order to operationalize the process of Islamic revival in Bosnia in the 1970s and 1980s. Then, I will implement the suggested analytical framework from Chapter I against the findings of section one. The latter will be viewed in terms of the changes in the social terrain and the increased role of ITAN in as a result of intense networking and the emergence of youth cultural and religious organizations on the ground.

As far as SMT occupies a middle ground between structural theories and rational choice theories, in order to operationalize the Islamic revival in the 1970s and 1980s I will use the classical SMT framework which relies on the following three main variables: (a) political opportunities structures, (b) mobilizing structures, and (c) cultural framing.

As the above case study findings unequivocally attest to, the political liberalization in Yugoslavia and the opportunity to declare themselves "as Muslims in the national sense" constituted viable policy and legal changes that provided the Islamic community, traditional Islamic clerics and Sufi orders locked between the competing

¹¹⁵ Alibasic, "Globalization and Its Impact."

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 4.

Catholic and Serbian churches with something that they could not have had and would not have refused – space. As I showed in the above case study, such a space allowed them to embark on an unprecedented rebuilding and expansion of Islamic religion. The local (emic) political opportunities were backed up by the larger process of Islamic revival in the Arab world, especially after the Iranian revolution that allowed for foreign financial support.

Consequently, in the beginning of 1990s, building on the brewing contention against the Communist authorities and their supporters in the IZ, the emerging SDA provided the needed structural mobilizing agent in order for the phenomenon of Islamic revival to be able to gain broader social base and mobilize contention. In this regard, as Lederer¹¹⁷ (2001) identified, “the ruling Party has had a pronounced Islamic orientation and the symbiosis of ethnic and national identities, ideology and power, Party and state, allowed it to extent its control over the population, which voted for it massively at several elections.”

Two necessary caveats are due here. First, the SDA’s ideology of Islamism was able to take advantage of the broad political changes that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and harness the emerging political opportunities in order to materialize the Bosnian state and nation. Nevertheless, despite the fact that SDA used the existing traditional ulema and Sufi orders to further mobilize support for its cause, it is important to elaborate on the cultural toolbox that invoked certain framings that were able to resonate with the target audience. Here, I suggest that Islam or Islamic frames did not constitute the sharpest and most effective tool in the cultural toolbox. This thesis posits that what happened in the beginning of the 1990s and during the war was more of a process of *nationalization of Islam* rather than the *Islamisation of the Bosnian nation*. Due to the lack of myths, legends, historic symbols and values that were abundant with their enemies, Islam was the only cultural frame that could have resonated with the Bosnians. Thus, SDA used Muslim religion as a mobilizing frame and powerful identity modifier against the Serbian and Croatian threat. Such a choice does not come as a surprise as the Christian Orthodox Serbian and Croatian Catholic churches necessarily

117 Lederer, 9.

depicted the war into religious cultural frames that due to the Turkish occupation of these lands easily caught up their denominations. For the Bosnians there had not been many choices, especially when they found themselves in the midst of a Serbo-Croatian rivalry in which both sides viewed them first as Muslims and second as Bosniaks or Slav descendents. A grim statistic of the war confirms the extent to which religion played in the conflict. Almost all Muslim historic and cultural landmarks located in the areas occupied by Serbs and Croats were destroyed, including 1,024 mosques and other Muslim religious sites.¹¹⁸ As Perica (2003) pointed out, “Slavic Muslims and their Islamic Community were primary targets of genocide carried out against them by the Serbs while also endangered by, post 1990, the increasingly unfriendly Croats.”¹¹⁹

In this regard, the Islamic revival before 1991 in the face of the prewar turmoil, war and genocide allowed for readily usable cultural framings embedded in Islamic religion, which led on their part to unprecedented politicization and “nationalization of Islam.”¹²⁰

As far as we are still in the midst of the current process of Islamic revival and do not necessarily have the comfort of objective hindsight, whether the Islamic fundamentalism or what Bougarel terms as “ethnic nationalism” was the driving force of Muslim militancy will remain a contentious issue at least in mid-term perspective. Here, my goal is to take into account and analyze the broader impact of such an Islamic revival on the spread of ITAN and establish the possible development of such revival in the 1990s into a viable SM.

Inarguably the 1992-1995 war was a catalyzing event that allowed for foreign organizational agents to be infused and radically changed the current process of Islamic revival. In this respect, the latter accounts more for what Tarrow terms cross border

¹¹⁸ Perica, 166.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 168.

¹²⁰ Ibid., Bougarel.

diffusion¹²¹ facilitated by the transnational political exchange¹²² between SDA and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) states.

If SMT framework is applied in an attempt to operationalize the Islamic revival after the war, it is evident that both the political opportunity structure and cultural framings are two of the three variables that changed in such a way that it would be farfetched to identify any growing social movement on the ground. An independent state of Bosnia was established after Dayton, and especially after 2000 even the political and social settings did not facilitate any emergence of radical Islamic social movement dynamics on the ground. Nevertheless, I think such an analysis provides only satisfying findings while it does not necessary account for the real situation on the ground. As I showed above, for the last 10 years after Dayton, Islam in Bosnia has been straddling due to the fragmentation/polarization of the previously quite uniform Hanafi Islam. In this sense, due to what Roy called “deterritorialization,” Bosnia still provides post-battle space like Iraq and Afghanistan in which the “IC is forced to compete with new Islamic organizations for the position of exclusive interpreter of Islam which it enjoyed for last six decades.”¹²³

Here, in order to test the above hypotheses, I will implement McAdam’s analytical approach in order to operationalize the impact of the transnational networks in terms of ideas, resources, movements, Islamic centers, networks, schools and even cadres. I will focus on several structural agents already identified as the driving force behind the current Islamic revival and assess whether they have the potential of spurring a radical Islamic movement in Bosnia. In the parlance of classic SMT here, I will elaborate on the mobilizing structures and framing processes. Of greater importance for the current process are the Islamic ITAN and local youth religious organizations such as AIY.

121 According to Tarrow, “since it [cross border diffusion] is uncontrolled by strong connective tissue across boundaries, diffusion leaves great scope for domestic opportunities and constraints to affect how challenges are transformed in their new settings. Diffusion is a transnational phenomenon that is both temporary and unrooted as such in domestic social networks” (p. 186).

122 As Tarrow states, “By transnational political exchange, I refer to temporary forms of cooperation among essentially national actors that identify a common interest or set of values in a particular political configuration.” (p. 187).

123 Alibasic, “Globalization and Its Impact.”

As Tarrow pointed out, “though transnational advocacy networks are analytically distinct from social movements...they are *biographically* and *thematically* in the debt of social movements.”¹²⁴ For Tarrow, the spread of ITAN is something positive and encouraging as “they are powerful base for a change in the world today.” Nevertheless, the case study of Bosnia showed that such a spread of these networks has not necessarily been embedded in the local social networks. In this regard, the principal contention of this thesis is that in the case of Bosnia, due to historical, cultural, and contextual factors, ITAN were not able to provide Islamic framings that were qualitatively different from the one used to reinforce the ethno-nationalism. Certainly the end effect of their activity on the ground has helped to create or intensify their global Muslim solidarity and emotional attachment to the global Muslim community – ummah. Still, using McAdam’s analytical framework, such an attachment hardly can be interpreted as what he terms a process of *social appropriation* – the social setting and the ideas that typically animate in social settings, along with the collective identity that binds the members of that setting together and somehow get appropriated in the service of the social movement. Certainly, ITAN has been able to tap and augment the process of Islamic revivalism and also provide sites such as mosques and cultural centers for sustainment of social movement activity. Still, I suggest that through some of its structural agents, ITAN actually played a very important role in the social appropriation of radical Salafi ideas from the Middle East, but mainly through the Islamic students that boomed in the Arab world after 1995. It is also important to point out that such a process of social appropriation necessarily takes longer than the time for “progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the GSJ ideology” in the case study suggested by Sageman (2004).

Though ITAN in itself did not have the dynamic and the potential to spur a local social movement dynamic, they still were able, over the period of a decade, to spur some changes in some collective identities, routine cultural practices or organizational practices that got appropriated in this new line of action. As Alibasi attested to it, “the arrival of Islamic missionaries and mujahids, as well as the increase in the number of Bosnian students of Islam in the Muslim world, local interpretation of Islam, some Muslim practices and certain aspects of Muslim culture came under pressure of

¹²⁴ Tarrow, 2.

universally/unitary Muslim ideas and movements.”¹²⁵ One of these movements has been the GSJ. Before turning to the process of social appropriation that I deem the most crucial of all elements provided by McAdam, I would like to offer a brief anthropological analysis of the possible changes in the social terrain in central Bosnia.

A crucial element in understanding such a dynamic is to follow the massive emergence and proliferation of local Islamic youth organizations predominantly in central Bosnia. In this respect, to understand their role, it is important to elaborate on the change of social interactions due to the influx of mujaheddin religious leaders and Bosnian students in Islam among the local traditionalist settings. Borrowing the concepts of *communities of identities* and *communities of locality*¹²⁶, the Salafi followers led to qualitative change into the social terrain in central Bosnia by restructuring the traditional family relations and social hierarchy through building a new type of relationship by social appropriation of Salafi ideas. Such a process has been initially spurred by some of the religious leaders of the Salafi mujaheddin that were amply supported by the ITAN. In this regard, the example of Imad el-Misri provides an illustration of how the traditional communities of locality (based on the regional and extended family ties and relations) were gradually displaced by the community of identity centered on the Salafi ideology. Such social appropriation was done through the religious courses supervised and led by el-Masri as a prerequisite for entering in the el-Mujahid brigade. After the war, such an activity continued as he did the same for Active Islamic Youth. At the same time, as after the IC was endowed by the constitution to be the sole representative of Bosnian Muslims, the returning graduates of Islamic studies in the Muslim world has been often isolated by the IC and kept away from the IC run mosques. In effect, their activity naturally congregated in the central areas of Bosnia where they soon acquired considerable influence through the local foreign supported mosques or madrassas attended by youths in their formative years when they look for a different leader than the local traditional imam to follow.

¹²⁵ Alibasic, “Globalization and Its Impact.”

¹²⁶ Marks, Meer, and Nilson.

Gradually over the period of 10 years through such transfer of ideas from the Middle East backed up by financial support from various ITAN currently led to the emergence of a contentious environment among the various Islamic groups and to social appropriation of more radical ideas. It is worth noting the importance of the local marrying of ITAN with organizations on the ground that have the potential to achieve the changes in views, practices, and beliefs previously discussed that would lead to local support of radical Islamic agenda on the ground. Thus, both the importance of previous jihad and current proselytisation of ITAN should not be underestimated. In this respect, ITAN and the Islamic graduates have appropriated or transformed the emerging youth organizations and spread the influence of radical ideas through them. In this regard, the process of non-relational diffusion and brokerage¹²⁷ seem to account for the potential growth of such organizations into the Islamic movement.

I offer a brief look into the evolution of AIY in Bosnia. The Active Islamic Youth, which the local media say has Saudi ties, was founded in 1995 to spread a stringent version of Islam called Wahhabism. Its national headquarters are in Zenica. Besides Sarajevo, the AIY's main strongholds are in central Bosnia Travnik, Bogojno, and Zavidovci. The organization claims that it has over 2,000 members, mainly students.¹²⁸ The growth of the organization that recruits mainly among the local youths started with the active support of mujahidin as Imas el-Misri. The majority of the members of these organizations are young men from rural areas although urban, highly educated youths are well represented as well. Their numbers are, however, uncertain and may reach a few thousand. In addition, it publishes the second most widely read Islamic magazine (fortnightly) "Saff" (9,000). It has been well-established how the organization supports itself, as there has been enough evidence that AIY has been relying primarily on its ties with the Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina and several charities in the past such as Furkan. The AIY has been leaning toward ideas of Saudi dissidents Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-'Awdah¹²⁹ which is perhaps the reason behind the change in the HSC policy. While the essentials of the process of social

¹²⁷ Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 291- 295.

¹²⁸ Alibashi, "C-SIS Working Paper No. 2," 18.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 8.

appropriation of Salafi ideas are among that which was described above, AIY poses interest as part of the greater question of the possible cultural frames that can lead to its and similar organizations' radicalization.

Such frames might emanate along the following issues. First, an escalating competition contention between IC and the Salafi organizations could spur greater contention actions. On several occasions, advocates of local Islamic tradition used violence against 'Salafis' in Bosnian mosques or simply prevented them from entering mosques.

Second, the issue of returning refugees has been declared ahead of time as over. Nevertheless, the Bosnian offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood has actively started since 2003 to recruit members of families of Muslim returnees in the territory of Republika Srpska, often in cooperation with the Bosniak humanitarian association Sedra.¹³⁰

Finally, the most viable frame for contentious actions that has been used came as a result of U.S./NATO interventionist policy, especially after 2001. In this respect, the societal memories of handling of Srebrenica massacre are still alive. In addition, AIY was able to stage several demonstrations in Sarajevo because of the handing over of six Algerian nationals that had been previously acquitted by the Bosnian court of terrorist charges.

The implications of such existing repeating use of cultural frames go beyond the scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, while there is not a clear answer to what extent the current process of Islamic revival can be interpreted as an initial stage of the emergence of viable radical Islamic movement on the ground, I, through SMT, anthropological and structural analysis showed that Bosnia is still a contested ground for several competing Islamic groups and brands. In addition, the process of social appropriation of radical Salafi ideology has been evoked for more than ten years now while at the same time several cultural frames have been effectively used by local organizations to spur contentious actions.

¹³⁰ "New Balkans Terrorist Weapons Supply Lines Revealed," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, November/December 2003; 31, 11/12; Military Module, 17.

The importance of the possible emergence of the Islamic movement in the country can be dwarfed by the possible contentious actions that can catch EUFOR in the middle. As in December 2004, British Major-General David Leakey commented, “Bosnia is still recovering from a very bloody war. The ethnic tensions which started the war, in a way are still here.”¹³¹ Even the very presence of peacekeeping forces could be a convenient target for radical elements as the recent arrest in November 2005 showed. Whatever the instigating effect, the possibility of ripple effects among the countries with considerable Muslim diaspora that make up EUFOR remain high, bearing in mind the November demonstrations in France, Germany and Belgium.¹³²

Another possibility is the possible local recruitment of Muslims into the global Salafi jihadist movement ideologically associated with Al Qaeda. While the former possibility goes beyond the purpose of this thesis, the latter will be further explored in Chapter V.

C. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I offered an operationalization of the current Islamic revival in Bosnia, starting with a comparative historical analysis of the evolvement of the phenomena for the last 80-odd years.

I showed that the revival in the country is sustained and supported mainly by foreign sources, organizations and Arab states. One of the principal conclusions that this chapter offers is that without such a financial and ideological support, the scope and character of the phenomena would be qualitatively different from the existing one.

My analysis proved that Bosnia is a re-emerging contested area between the incumbent IC and the increasing number of Middle Eastern religious organizations, charities and foundations.

Due to such a competition on the ground, I showed that local youth organizations on the ground have the resources and the potential to use the existing cultural frames in

¹³¹ As quoted in “EU Force Starts Bosnian Mission,” *BBC News.com*, December 2, 2004, <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Europe/4060739.stm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹³² For more on these instigating effects see Charles V. Pena, *Al Qaeda: The Balkans Connection*, (Mediterranean Quarterly) http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v016/16.4pena.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

order to evolve into a possible radical Islamic social movement on the ground. The possible issues around which such a mobilization can be spurred are nationalism, refugee return and current governmental policy missteps.

Catalysts for these frames can be the structural changes in the social terrain, the returning student of Islam from the Middle East, and the increasing social appropriation of radical Salafi ideas by parts of the population residing in the central part of the country.

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III. CASE STUDY OF BULGARIA

A. BACKGROUND

In this chapter, I offer a comparative case study of the Republic of Bulgaria in an attempt to operationalize the current Islamic revival in the country. Such a choice is not a random one, as it is driven by several factors. First, Bulgaria emerged as a key regional ally of the U.S. in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the refusal of Turkey to support Operation “Iraqi Freedom” (OIF). Such a position has also been predetermined by its geo-strategic situation, current membership in NATO and planned acceptance to the EU in the beginning of 2007. Second, the EU membership negotiation process has turned Bulgaria into a “doorstep of Europe” and front state in countering illegal human trafficking and immigration. According to the State Department’s 2005 Trafficking in Persons report, Bulgaria has been a “transit country and to a lesser extent, a source country”¹³³ for trafficking. Third, despite the legacy of the “Revival Process”¹³⁴ conducted in 1984-1985, the growing instability of the region in the 1990s, and the late shift to market economy in 2006, Bulgaria not only managed to avoid slipping into the internecine religious conflict pattern set by Yugoslavia, but also emerged as a state often referred to as an “ethnic model”¹³⁵ on the Balkans.

In addition to the impact of these factors, Islamic revival in Bulgaria the country is a case that draws attention and deserves further analysis because of two counter-factors that gained momentum over the last decade. The country has not been spared from the general process of religious revival that has swept through Eastern and Central Europe since 1991. For example, 61 denominations, in addition to the Bulgarian Orthodox

133 US Department of State, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2005*, 73, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

134 Mila Maeva, “The Revival Process and Its Influence on Bulgarian Turks’ Identity in Turkey,” *Oxford Balkan Society: South East European Studies Programme*, May 29-30, 2004, 2, <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/maeva.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

135 Antonina Zhelyazkova, “The Bulgarian Ethnic Model,” *East European Constitutional Review*, 10, no. 4, (Fall 2001), <http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol10num4/focus/zhelyazkova.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005, and “Ethnic Model for the Balkans,” *Sofia Echo*, 2001, http://www.sofiaecho.com/article/ethnic-model-for-the-balkans/id_2314/catid_5, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

Church (BOC), were registered at the end of January 2005 – a 36% increase over the previous reporting period at the end of January 2004.¹³⁶

Over the last several years there has been intense infighting within the Muslim religious leadership that fueled the growing concerns about foreign funding and radical Islamic influence in the country's minority enclaves. For instance, in 2004 according to the head of the Bulgarian military intelligence, "there are religious centres in Bulgaria that belong to Islamic groups financed mostly by Saudi Arabian groups, that possibly have links to radical organisations like the Muslim Brothers in Egypt."¹³⁷ Despite the fact that these centers were dismantled, still the issue of the scope, manifestations, and further evolution of this revival remains open.

B. CHAPTER OUTLINE

As previously noted, significant differences exist between states with majority and minority Muslim populations in the Balkans. This important dichotomy will be examined in comparative analyses of Bosnia and Bulgaria.

I briefly outline the scope, characteristics and manifestations of the observed Islamic revival in the country. The first section offers an examination of the religious demography and historic overview of the development of Islamic religion in Bulgaria. I outline the diverse nature of the Islamic minorities in the country and argue for the need of a case by case approach when analyzing the current revival.

The second section embarks on critical examination of the status of the major Muslim minorities under the communist rule (1944-1989) and operationalizes the Islamic revival after the democratic changes against the state policy for the last 15 years. It also elaborates on the cleavages among the Turkish and Bulgarian-speaking Muslim minority that led to the growing influence of foreign charitable foundations and NGOs in the ethnic minority areas.

¹³⁶ Here is an example how the number of religious registration with the government increased between 2003 and 2005. In 2003 there were 36 in 2003, 45 in 2004 (increase of 25%) and 61 in 2005 (36% increase). For more see Bulgaria: International Religious Freedom Report 2004 and 2005, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *US Department of State*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35446.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹³⁷ "Bulgaria Dismantles Islamic Centres," *Daily Times*, January 13, 2004, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_13-1-2004_pg7_44, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

I argue that the current revival in Bulgaria has been qualitatively different from the one in Bosnia. First, the structural and ideological differences between ex-Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have to be taken into account. In the case of Bulgaria, such dissimilarities did not allow for the emergence of religion as a primary denominator of social relations. Second, the ruling political parties after 1991 embarked on a course of repaying the Muslim community for the historic injustices that they had been subjected to. Such a policy has been pursued in order to get political dividends and allow for a stable parliamentary or a governmental ruling coalition with the party representing Turkish minority – the Movement for Rights and Freedom. Finally, as a result of the internal political scene imperatives combined with the continual external EU pressure aimed at promoting religious tolerance in the country, the state inadvertently lost control in the Muslim minority populated areas of Bulgaria. Unlike the case of Bosnia, these factors allowed for a vacuum that has been easily filled by local and foreign religious organizations trying to increase their influence over the population.

Building upon the findings in the second section, the third section will test the suggested hypotheses and operationalize the current revival in the contemporary context. I draw attention towards the growing dependency of some local Muslim organizations on foreign financial help that, especially in the areas inhabited by the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, already has spurred some changes in the social terrain that led to the social appropriation of Salafi ideas.

The thesis suggests a differentiated approach towards the issue of revival depending on whether the focus of analysis is on the Turkish, Kasilbashi or Pomak minority. My principal argument is that because of their diversity, inter-competition and mutual perceptions of each other, it is incorrect to argue that there is a unified, mainstream Islamic revival. On the contrary, I claim that every ethnic (religious) minority has to be analyzed separately and then in relation to the others, and then to the Christian community. Such an approach maintains that there are several tiers in the observed mainstream revival that need to be put into perspective.

In terms of the prospect of the current revival, I argue that like Bosnia, Bulgaria constitutes an emerging contested arena between radical Middle Eastern organizations

and the local Mufti that necessitates a revised state policy. In the last section I offer several starting points for analyzing the contentious link between Islamic revival and GSJ in Chapter IV.

C. ISLAM IN BULGARIA – HISTORIC OVERVIEW

1. Religious Demography

Muslim minorities have been an issue for almost every Bulgarian government since the state gained independence in 1878 after almost 500 years of Turkish occupation and oppression. Since the first census of 1887, the question of religious affiliation was explored. Unlike any other state in the Balkans, religious identity has not been directly associated with the ethnic one. The primary reason was that Bulgaria was the last state that gained independence from Turkey and, at the same time occupying a strategic place in the underbelly of Europe, the country and its population has been continuously subjected to sporadic Turkish assimilation campaigns. Certainly there has been contention whether such campaigns really existed, but what is more important in this case is the legacy of the Turkish rule. As noted, it would be incorrect to lump and view all the ethnically diverse religious minorities that practice Islam into one homogenous Islamic community. Such an argument can be made for Bosnia, but in the case of Bulgaria it is more appropriate to talk about Islamic *communities* rather than a united *ummah*. The purpose of this section is to cast out the main characteristics of these communities through a synthetic analysis of the Bulgarian history for the last 120 years.

I suggest as a starting point a comparative view of the population of Bulgaria according to its religious affiliation as shown in Table 1. Then, a brief analysis of the results of 2001 census follows.

POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND RELIGION GROUP AS OF 1.03.2001

Districts	Total	Christian	Moslem	Other	Not stated	Unknown
Total	7 928 901	6 638 870	966 978	14 937	283 309	24 807

POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND ETHNIC GROUP AS OF 1.03.2001

Districts	Total	Bulgarian	Turkish	Gypsies	Other	Not stated	Unknown
Total	7 928 901	6 655 210	746 664	370 908	69 204	62 108	24 807

POPULATION BY DISTRICTS AND MOTHER TONGUE AS OF 1.03.2001

Districts	Total	Bulgarian	Turkish	Gypsies	Other	Not stated	Unknown
Total	7 928 901	6 697 158	762 516	327 882	71 084	45 454	24 807

Table 1. Results of the 2001 Census.

As seen in Table 1, the Christian orthodox denomination constitutes 6,552,751 people, or 82.6% of the population. The fact that over a 100-year period the segment of the population professing orthodox Christianity has not changed much, between 80.7% in 1900 and 85.7% in 1992, led to the codifying of the role of the Christian church in the Bulgarian Constitution. According to article 13 (3) “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.”¹³⁸

The figures for the Muslim minority in the country could be misleading as at first glance there is a discrepancy between the numbers of the Muslim and the Turkish minority (also Turkish speaking individuals). The internal specifics of the Bulgarian Muslim minorities account for the differences in comparison to the Bosnia case. The religious affiliation is not directly associated or tied with ethnicity. Before delving into these specifics, it is worth picturing the spectrum and specifics of Muslim minorities in the country.

The Muslim population of Bulgaria generally includes Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies and Tatars. They can be categorized into three main ethnic groups: Turks, Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) and Roma (Gypsy) Muslims. According to the census statistics in Table 1, they constitute about 12.2% of the population. Nevertheless, there

¹³⁸ *Bulgarian Constitution*, Chapter 1: Article 13.3, <http://www.online.bg/law/const/const1.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

are no clear statistics accounting for the number of Pomaks.¹³⁹ There has been scarce data in terms of what portion of the Turks are Sunni or Shia. For the purpose of this thesis, I posit a total number of Pomaks in the realm of about 120,000. This is the difference between the people with Muslim religious affiliation (966,978) and those that speak only the Turkish language (746,664).¹⁴⁰ As far as the Turkish population, delineation between Sunnis and Shiites is hardly known among them as most of the population is professing Hanafi (or folk Islam). Nevertheless, the number of the Shias is about 1.0% of the Turkish minority, which is about 80,000, known popularly as Kusulbashi or Alevi.¹⁴¹ The latter will not be part of the follow-up analysis as they in many ways maintain the Orthodox customs of communion, confession, and honoring saints, and thus constitute a fairly insulated cultural yet well integrated socially group of the general population.

Geographically, almost 80% of the Turks live in two compact zones in Northeastern and Southeastern Bulgaria, while 90% of the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) live in the Rhodope Mountains on the Bulgarian— the Greek border.

2. Origins of the Muslim Minorities and Their Relation with the State in the 20th Century

The outlined religious demography shows that not only Bulgaria has been on the crossroads between Europe and the Middle East, but also constitutes the cradle of Balkan Islam and the homeland of Slavic Christianity.

a. Turks

Bulgarian historical science, depending on the historic period, has put forward two contradictory theories about the Ottoman invasion and the origins of the

¹³⁹ For the sake of clarity it is necessary to point out that the terms “Pomaks” and “Bulgarian Muslims” are used interchangeably; adherents to Islam in Bulgaria are referred to as “Muslims of Bulgaria.”

¹⁴⁰ This figure is also close to the one that is based on 1992 census when 70,252 persons declared “ethnic Bulgarian” identity, but Muslim religion. In addition, about 35,000 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims from the Rhodopes registered as Turkish-speaking and about 70,000 of them declared “ethnic Turkish” identity. For more see “The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Policies since 1878,” *Bulgarian Helsinki Committee* (Sofia, November, 2003), 3-4, http://www.bghelsinki.org/special/en/2003_Muslims_fm.doc, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁴¹ According to 1992 census there are 83,537 Shiite Muslims in Bulgaria and Turkish is the mother tongue of 58,060 of them. Still, most of the Alevi are not quite familiar with the term Shiite Muslims.

Turkish population in Bulgaria. These theories are in direct correlation with the contradictory policies of the Bulgarian state towards Turkish and other Muslim minorities.

The first theory posits that the Ottoman invasion in the 14th century was followed by intensive colonization of the population from Asia Minor.¹⁴² The second theory argues that the Turkish community in Bulgaria is considered to be a result of large-scale forced conversions of Islam or voluntary conversions which caused people to gradually forget their Bulgarian language.¹⁴³ In respect to the first theory, the ethnic origin of Bulgarian Turks has never been disputed since the independence of 1878, while the latter theory positing to the existence of turkicised Bulgarians was at the center of the 1980's assimilation campaign.¹⁴⁴

b. The Bulgarian-Speaking Muslims (Pomaks)

Currently every state, in which the Pomaks live, namely Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, has its own theory of their origin in line with that state's nationalistic policy. This minority has certainly been the source of much controversy in the Bulgarian society. In Bulgaria, Pomaks are referred to as both "Bulgarian Mohammedans" and "Pomaks." The second is mainly used in pejorative terms. Usually the majority of the ethnic Bulgarians believe that Pomaks are Turkicised Bulgarians and tend to look down upon them as "traitors of the faith," "apostates," etc.¹⁴⁵ Several sources uphold the position that the Pomaks between themselves are not quite clear about their origins. In this respect, their preferential ethnic affiliation has an interesting geographic structure – in the Western Rhodope Mountains they prefer to be Turks, in the Middle Rhodope – Bulgarians, and in the Eastern Rhodope and northeastern Bulgaria – they prefer the neutral term "Muslims."¹⁴⁶ Still, the general negative attitude of the ethnic Bulgarian

¹⁴² Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, *Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*, n. d., 1, www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/Marushiakova.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁴⁴ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, "The Human Rights of Muslims in Bulgaria in Law and Policies Since 1878," (November, 2003), 5, http://www.bghelsinki.org/special/en/2003_Muslims_fm.doc, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 11. (Note: For this reason, they are called Torbeshi in Macedonia as referring to people that sold their religion for a *torba* (bag) of beans.)

¹⁴⁶ Marushiakova and Popov, 1.

population, the cultural differences between the Pomaks and the Turkish minority, and the state policies of forced assimilation before 1991 elevate the importance of the social terrain analysis in connection with the Islamic revival in the country.

D. ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN BULGARIA

1. Muslim Minorities and the Bulgarian State

In order to understand the current dynamics and evolution of Islam in Bulgaria in the context of the outlined Muslim communities, a brief overview of the uneasy relation between Islam and the Bulgarian state is due. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the period after 1944 which laid down to a greater extent the array of state policies after the fall of communism.

After the communist take over on September 9, 1944, the ethnic minorities in the country became the targets of either elaborate policy of respecting and promoting their religious and cultural rights or outright assimilation campaigns that had their climax in the 1984.

The main contention of this section is that the relations between the state and Muslim minorities have not been based on religious but rather on nationalistic grounds. I also argue that the two-pronged state policies of force assimilation and attempts to increase the level of education and thus secularize the Turkish minority led to the emergence of intellectual elite that was able to capitalize on the mistakes of the communist governments before 1991 in the post-communist period. The political opportunities after 1991 led to the emergence of an initially ethnic political party that secured the Bulgarian ethnic model at the expense of having the decisive influence over the political developments in Bulgaria for the last 15 years.

Immediately, after WWII, Islam was looked upon in line with the communist ideology which basically rejects any religion. Thus, despite the initial official state course of incorporation of the minorities into the new society, there were concentrated efforts by the state to gradually ban religious education, nationalize all Quranic schools and all private (including Turkish) schools, and impose uniform curriculum by the year 1952.¹⁴⁷ Inevitably, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the authorities came up with the slogan

¹⁴⁷ Marushiakova and Popov, 15.

“Cultural revolution” that was aimed at rejecting the all religious backwardness and fanaticism.¹⁴⁸ From this period on until 1984, the relationship between the state and the minorities started to continually deteriorate. Initially the government adopted a somewhat two-sided approach that on the one hand argued for integration of national minorities, while on the other side curtailed and supervised the their rights.¹⁴⁹ The initial focus was against the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) – since mid-1960s there has been several campaigns of changing their names and attempts of “Patriotic Upbringing of the Bulgarian Mohammedans.”¹⁵⁰ At the same time, through negotiations with Turkey, part of the Turkish population (about 50,000) was able to leave Bulgaria in the 1968 to 1978 period. At the same time, between 1959 and 1972, Turkish schools were merged with Bulgarian schools and Turkish language instruction was gradually and effectively eliminated.

By 1974, the names of 220,000 Pomaks had been changed.¹⁵¹ By that time, the new Constitution of 1971 abolished all mention of minorities and religious rights, merely preserving the vague definition of “a citizen of non-Bulgarian origin.”¹⁵² What was later formulated as the ‘revival process’ had its apogee in the second half of January and the beginning of February 1985 and started with a 1978 resolution of the Central Committee of the BCP accepted as “Resolution for the Improvement of Work among the Descendants of Islamized Bulgarians.”¹⁵³ The associated name changing campaign in 1981 that essentially followed the one of 1962 and 1971 has been also associated with movement restrictions imposed on Pomaks in order to keep them separated from the enclaves of Turkish minority.

¹⁴⁸ Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 56.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 57.

¹⁵⁰ Marushiakova and Popov, 17. (*Note*: This was a 1970 resolution of the Bulgarian Communist Party.)

¹⁵¹ Every non-Slavic or non-Bulgarian first and family name had to be changed into a Slavic one. Usually the Pomaks and the Turks had Turkish or Arabic names that also did not have the customary suffixes –ov or –ev—for the Bulgarian family names. Thus, the changes were among those lines: for example, a person whose original name was Naim Suleimanoogly most likely had to change his name to Naum Shalamanov, a perfectly sounding Bulgarian word.

¹⁵² *Bulgarian Constitution of 1971*, art. 45, para. 7, as cited by Marushiakova and Popov, 19.

¹⁵³ Marushiakova and Popov, 20.

Finally, the authorities embarked on the program of ‘revival’ (1985) that started with name changes of all Turks and other Muslims living in the Rhodope Mountains and soon affected all Turks living in the country. The process was accompanied by a widespread campaign for obliterating all signs of Turkish identity, such as specific styles of dress, religious customs, oriental music and forbidding the use of Turkish language in public.¹⁵⁴

2. Islamic Revival Before 1989

Due to the uneasy relations between the Bulgarian state and Muslim minorities and the total control of the state over the religious issues, Islamic revival before 1991 is hard to operationalize or even determine to what extent it ever existed. My contention here is that such revival emerged more in terms of various forms of Islamic activism as a reaction to the state policy and repression. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to unequivocally show whether the underground Islamic activism emerged as a reaction to the state in the 1980s or that it never ceased to develop after WWI and just took a more secretive turn after that.

In the beginning of the 1980s (before the 1984/5 assimilation campaign), Bulgaria was shaken by a series of terrorist bombings that mainly hit the railway stations of Sofia and Plovdiv (the biggest cities), Varna airport, etc. Most of them were associated with secretive Turkish groups. Still, to this day it is unclear what were the real motivations of such attacks and whether they were spurred by religious radicalism or initiated by the Bulgarian secret services.

Apart from that, the Sufi orders in Bulgaria did not cease to exist and indeed continued to operate. For example, in 1982, the authorities intercepted and banned a meeting by Naksibendi and Kadiri *tariqas*.¹⁵⁵ Nevertheless, due to the total domination of the state, Muslim minorities in Bulgaria did not have the political opportunity to develop influential Islamic opposition in opposition to the official Muslim organizations and clerics. They were both penetrated by the state security services or financially dependent on the authorities. For example, the Chief Mufti’s Office, the regional Mufti’s offices and the Muslim communities received subsidies from the state and the clerics

¹⁵⁴ Marushiakova and Popov, 23.

¹⁵⁵ Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria* (London: Hurst & Co., 1997), 74.

were socially secured and received state pensions.¹⁵⁶ After 1985, the Resolution of the Imam meeting even stated in the face of the ongoing “Revival process” that “Muslim Bulgarians never belonged to the Turkish nation.”¹⁵⁷

In addition, in the absence of formal theologian training, usually the post of *hodzha* was passed down the family line, from father to son or uncle to nephew. At the same time the illegal course in Turkish language and the Koran were organized in the secrecy of private homes.¹⁵⁸

There are two major consequences of the pre-1991 state policy. First, it created an irreparable rift between the Muslim minorities. The state was successful in using the Pomaks in setting them into the administration of the revival process in the minority areas. That destroyed the previously existed links between the Turkish and Bulgarian—speaking Muslims. Second, after the democratic changes, Muslim minorities did not have uncompromised religious leaders to utilize the opened political opportunities.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the political activism against the state failed in 1985, the new political currents of *perestroika* led to the emergence of political opportunities that allowed the minority Muslim population to organize several demonstrations and protests in May-June 1989. While accounting for the existence of underground organizations, there has not been any evidence that such social protests were utilizing any religious cultural contention frames. Still, the legacy of the 1944 to 1989 period defines the permissive environment for the resurgence of Islam and minority rights after democratic changes.

3. Current Islamic Revival in Bulgaria

In this section I offer a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the current Islamic revival in Bulgaria. The Islamic revival elaborates on the revived interest towards

¹⁵⁶ Maria Koinova, “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Muslims of Bulgaria,” *Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe – Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE)*, December, 1999, 10, <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pdf/cedime-se-bulgaria-muslims.doc>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁵⁷ Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (BTA), 1985 as cited in Koinova, p. 12.

¹⁵⁸ Nadege Ragaru, “Islam in Post-Communist Bulgaria: An Aborted 'Clash of Civilizations?'” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 29, No 2, 2001, 6, <http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/media/cbjnrwrqunna9alwup4u/contributions/w/9/n/n/w9nnqnjhjhak2jqqd.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

religion as an ethnic identifier after years of suppressed religiosity, the politicization of ethnicity manifested in the emergence of several ethnic political parties of which Movement for Rights and Freedoms proved crucial in maintaining ethnic stability unlike the case of Bosnia, and, finally, the different scope and character of the revival among the Turks and Pomaks.

My principal contention is that this phenomenon should be viewed in the context of (a) interethnic relations between the two main Muslim minorities¹⁵⁹, (b) lack of religious elites to spur the sustained theological revival, and (c) resurgence and defense of the Muslim identity.

The Islamic revival in the first years after the “velvet revolution” took the form of rediscovering the religious roots and rebuilding of Muslim institutions. It has not been qualitatively different from the general religious revival among the population after years of suppressed religious rights. Thus, the process of Islamic revival was part and parcel of the resurgence of the Muslim identity. Nevertheless, the lack of viable religious elite led to a necessary secular posture of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms MRF, while in Bosnia, SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcie – Party for Democratic Action) had to rely on the traditional ulema to vie for success at the elections.

Still, the scope and scale of it were incomparable to the one in Bosnia. The Islamic Institute was opened in Sofia, and three religious high schools were founded in cities with large Muslim population (Shumen, Momchilgrad and Kardzali). Courses in Islam and Quran have been revived and run by the Mufti. According to different sources, there are about 1,150 mosques in the country.¹⁶⁰ In the immediate years after 1989 there was an initial burst of mosques building resulting in 150 new mosques. At the same time, around 1,900 churches were built.¹⁶¹ In addition, the office of Chief Mufti started issuing a regular publication in Turkish and in Bulgarian – *mjusjulmani* (Muslims). Others such

¹⁵⁹ Here, I purposefully exclude the Roma (Gipsy) Muslims, as most of their motivations of declaring themselves as Muslims stem from financial means. Still, it is important to know that in the past they have been subjected to several radical Islamic organizations.

¹⁶⁰ Alben Shkodrova and Iva Roudnikova, “Bulgaria: Investigation. Muslim Infighting Fuels Media Fundamentalism Fears” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR)* Balkan Crisis Report, No.519, Oct 7, 2004, 3, <http://archiv2.medienhilfe.ch/News/2004/SEE/IWPR519.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁶¹ Margot Badran, “Finding Islam,” *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, no. 552, (September 20 - 26, 2001), <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/552/feature.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

as *Zaman* (Time), a weekly magazine founded in 1992 and said to be close to Fethulah Gulen's neo-confreric movement in Turkey, followed. By contrast, *Shahida*, a publication controlled by el-Fatih ali Hassanein, the director of the European Islamic Council, offers a reading of Islam that falls closer to Saudi Wahhabism. Generally, the religious literature was easily available over the past decade but was mainly associated with foreign Turkish or Arab sources. In this regard, several foreign foundations such as Irhsad, Manar, Al-Waqf al-Islami, and World Muslim League, as well as a number of Islamic charity organizations (mostly from the Middle East and Iran) established themselves on the Bulgarian territory and started disseminating Islamic publications and sponsoring local social projects.¹⁶² As the state withdrew its support for the Chief Mufti Office, these organizations have been providing the necessary funds for the religious publications, religious seminars and summer courses. In addition, there has been continual growth in the number of Bulgarian Muslims sponsored through these charities, NGOs, the Office of the Chief Mufti and even MRF that have been sent to the religious schools in the Middle East.¹⁶³ Such a need was dictated because of the lack of trained imams in order to answer the increased interest of the Muslim population to Islam.

The Islamic revival has been to a certain extent appropriated by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) due to the political opportunities created by the conscious state policy after 1989 of religious and ethnic reconciliation. First of all, as pointed out above, an active Islamic resurgence connotes the existence of viable religious elites that were not tainted by any previous compromising relations with the communist authorities. In this regard, as Ragaru (2001) pointed out, the only elites who were in position to harness the general discontent of the humiliating "revival process" and promote the Muslim minorities' rights in the country were the secularized Turks who had been trained by the communist regime in the period of 1950 to 1970. In this regard, the minority mobilization took place on an ethnic rather than on a religious basis.¹⁶⁴ The end effect was the emergence of MRF. It is worth noting that the politicization of the minorities materialized itself only in the case of the Bulgarian Turks. Several factors contributed to

¹⁶² Marushiakova and Popov, 43; and Ragaru, 21.

¹⁶³ Ragaru, 21.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 31.

such a process. First of all, the June 1989 protests against communist government assimilation politics led to an emigration wave to Turkey of more than 300,000 ethnic Turks. Such an exodus had its economic consequences for the state, but on the other hand, for the Bulgarian Turks it entailed sale or loss of their real estates. It is unclear whether after 1991 Turkey or the U.S. provided strong political or financial back-up for the establishment of the new party. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the first post-socialist government though pressure to rehabilitate the Turkish minority for the change of their names and return of their property still put forward a lot of judicial barriers that effectively obstructed such a process. Thus, the social unrest among the Bulgarian Turks that started in the 1989 was effectively perpetuated and provided with powerful mobilization frames due to inadequate state policy and external pressure. Therefore, it naturally started evolving towards the formation of a political party that formally claimed to protect every Bulgarian citizens' rights but actually was pro and in defense of the - Bulgarian Turks from the outset.

Although the formation of such a political party has been contested on several occasions as the 1991 constitution forbids parties on ethnic or religious basis, the emergence of MFR has been very important to both promoting the rights of the Muslim minorities and, due to its balancing power in the Bulgarian politics, to the establishment of the Bulgarian ethnic model, unlike the developments in Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Still, the state inevitably rendered control to the MFR of the areas of the ethnic minorities and did not pursue any coherent economic or social policies in these regions. As Marushakova pointed out, "MRF's organizations exist in every town or village with a Turkish or Bulgarian-Muslim population," and usually they are quite significant for the life of these communities (including their local participation in local government).

Such a development has been implicitly tolerated by the major political parties (with certain exclusions) and the Bulgarian society in general, but did not account for the underlying cleavages among the Muslim minorities. As mentioned above, during the revival process, the Pomaks were used to occupy administrative posts and to enforce the state policy. After 1990, when MRF was registered, the tables turned against the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. The Islamic revival among Pomaks has to be analyzed against the background of their relations with the Turkish minority, their position within

MRF, and their complex group awareness that evolved rather interestingly after the 1989 democratic changes. As Marushiakova (2001) revealed, the Pomaks' ethnic affiliation depends on the social terrain they thrive in. Basically, they revived and maintained their identity in opposition to their neighbors. In the Western Rhodopes where they live with Bulgarian Christians, they tend to associate themselves with the Turkish identity. By contrast, in the Eastern Rhodopes where they live side by side with the Turkish minority, they tend to display a brand of anti—Turkish nationalism.¹⁶⁵

Thus, the support of Bulgarian Muslims for MRF in the Western Rhodopes is the strongest. Nevertheless, one has to take into account that their relation with the MRF is rather a tenuous one. Until 2001, there had been no access to the leadership positions within the movement. The Pomaks also did not have any representation in the Parliament until the 2005 elections.¹⁶⁶

Finally, Bulgarian Muslims are equally isolated from both the Bulgaria and Turkish state. According to Antoine Roger, there are four factors against which the position of ethnic minorities can be evaluated¹⁶⁷: internal dynamics, encouragement from ethnic “homeland,” behavior towards minorities by the host country, and economic relations between the minorities and majority. As pointed out above, MRF has full control of the ethnic areas, but at the same time, the economic situation of the Pomaks is considerably worse than that of the ethnic Turks. Due to the “big excursion” phenomenon in the summer of 1989, more than 300,000 ethnic Turks were allowed to leave the country after the demonstrations in May and June the same year. Thus, after the democratic changes and new Bulgarian state policy of rehabilitation, most of them either returned or sustained their relations with their home state. At the current moment, due to the double citizenship that these expatriates have, they constitute a very important “social commodity” for the use of Bulgaria as a jumping board for Turkish firms and corporations. Since Turkey is still in the beginning of the negotiation process to join EU, Bulgaria offers an excellent opportunity for these trade entities to access the EU market.

¹⁶⁵ Ragaru, 27.

¹⁶⁶ Information about the ethnic structure of the current Parliament is currently unavailable.

¹⁶⁷ Antoine Roger enriched Roger Brubaker's theory. For more see Antoine Roger's, “The European Union as a Political Incentive for Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Post-Communist Bulgaria and Romania,” *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 5, no. 1, (May 2003), 9-24.

At the same time, Bulgarian passports allow the ethnic Turks free travel in the EU. Thus, the situation of the Bulgarian-Muslims against the above mentioned factors seems to be almost desperate. On the one side, they have been generally despised and looked upon by both Turkish and Bulgarian Christian populations. On the other side, democratic changes in the country actually further impoverished them. As one resident of a village in the Rhodope Mountains attested, “Before people had jobs but not religious freedom. Now they have religious freedom but jobs are scarce.”¹⁶⁸

E. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS

In line with the above findings, this section tests the working hypotheses of the thesis in the case of Islamic revival in Bulgaria. As I showed in the previous sections, this phenomenon has to be analyzed in terms of the legacy of the authoritarian rule between 1944 and 1989, the uneasy relations among the Turks and Bulgarian Muslims on the one side and minority-majority interactions on the other, the place of MRF in Bulgarian political arena, and the strife economic situation of the Bulgarian Muslim population.

In this section, I test H1 and H2 in the context of the social terrain of the Pomaks. I effectively show that the Islamic revival is an internally (emic) driven phenomenon that is part of the process of an evolving group awareness for that minority.

In terms of the second hypothesis, which presupposes that the observed Islamic revival constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of local Islamic movements, this thesis argues that the process of social appropriation and non-relational diffusion of stricter versions of Islam emanating from the Middle East actually leads to internal isolation of the population from the rest of the society and to the emergence of a permissive environment for radical Islamic elements to thrive and proselytize Wahhabi Islam in these areas. I also warn against the possibility of transformation of the financial dependency on Middle East charities and NGOs into an ideological one.

1. H1: The Process of Islamic Revival is Mainly an Imported Phenomenon

Usually, the process of revival is a mix of local and imported factors. As the findings of the Bulgarian case study showed, after 1989 the resurgence of Islam during that period restored the link between the Muslim minorities and the rest of the Islamic

¹⁶⁸ Badran.

world. As Ragaru (2001) pointed out, the Islamic revival among the Turkish population should be viewed more in terms of reconsiderations of their self-perception and affirming their threatened identity.¹⁶⁹ What started as a social movement in 1989 that eventually led to the “great excursion” and the fall of the incumbent authoritarian regime in Bulgaria began losing its steam after 1991, as MRF was able to acquire significant influence on the internal political scene. Initially, due to attempts to rehabilitate its historical mistakes and to gain supporters in the turmoil of the collapse of the old regime, the new socialist government that made the “palace coup” in 1989 needed to show to the rest of the world its capability to reform. Thus, all of the contention frames that led to the mass demonstrations in 1989 were actually disempowered as the government promptly authorized the return of the Turkish names (1990), and then the Parliament voted the Public Education Act (1991), as well as the Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Public Education (1992), and finally the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (1997). To the same effect, as Ragaru pointed out, the lack of interethnic violence can be also explained because of the banality of the nationalistic rhetoric that has been appropriated by all political parties.¹⁷⁰ In addition, their relatively stable economic situation due to the retained connections with Turkey allowed them to stay aloof of the Muslim missionaries. After the initial boom, most specialists typically drew attention to the fact that the resurgence of Islam lost its momentum. As Ali Eminov recalls, “by 1995, the number of Muslims who attended the Friday prayer had declined considerably.”¹⁷¹

Nevertheless, as the findings of the case study showed, the revival has different developmental and social appropriations for the Bulgarian Muslim minority. It has been internally driven as the one witnessed among the Turkish authority, but while the latter was just recovering its severed links with the Muslim world and identity, the Pomaks have been appropriating the new practices and interpretations of Islam as a tool of affirming their identity against the Turkish one. Several field studies by Ragaru (2001),

¹⁶⁹ Ragaru, 22.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 11

¹⁷¹ Eminov, 69.

Ghodsee (2005), and Marushakova (2001) indicate that the different version of a stricter fundamentalist Islam proselytized by the Arab missionaries allows them to carve their own cultural niche.

Thus, despite the fact that the influx of foreign Islamic NGOs, charities, religious schools and financing of the building of new mosques can be viewed as a systemic characteristic of the post-communist transition period, nevertheless, the Islamic revival among the Pomaks has its internal dynamics and is facilitated by the attempts of that minority to reconstruct their identity and distinguish themselves from the ethnic Turks.

Traditionally, Pomaks have professed a moderate, almost secular version of Islam. Still, as Ragaru observed, in the Pomak community Islam was mostly sustained through oral transmission and was thus highly enriched by traditional beliefs and superstitions. Tradition was meticulously preserved in order to resist the attempts of the state control or force assimilation. In addition, as there was no Bulgarian translation of the Qur'an, familiarity with Islamic sacred texts was much lower in comparison to the Turkish-speaking minority.¹⁷² In his interview with anthropologist Ghalina Lozanova, Ragaru accounted for the instances when Pomaks asked for religious support from the Arab world: "Not long ago, some Pomaks showed me a letter they had sent to an Arab mufti asking for some guidance on the way Muslim rites should be performed."¹⁷³

By the same token, the field study done by Ghodsee¹⁷⁴ outlines the perceptions and aspirations of the Pomaks for the last 15 years. She had very rare insights about the perceptions of the Bulgarian Muslims vis-à-vis the ethnic Turks that dovetails with the analysis offered in the case study. In most cases, Muslim Turks have been viewed as the ones interested in Pomak political support and the ones who want to subjugate Pomaks under Turkish leadership. Wahhabism offered them a clear way of distinguishing from the Muslim Turks, and at the same time the stricter version of Islam is perceived as a marker of superiority over the Turks and as a proof of the close links of the Muslim Turks with the contemporary tendencies of the Islamic world.

¹⁷² Ragaru, 27-28.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 28.

¹⁷⁴ Kristen Ghodsee and Christian Filipov, "Cultural Rights in the Age of the 'War on Terror,'" *Carnegie Council on Ethnic and International Relations*, (Spring 2005), 3, <http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prmID/5146>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

These issues and perceptions due to the general geographic isolation of the Pomak minority hardly penetrated the Bulgarian media and society until 2003 when the power struggle for the post of Chief Mufti of Bulgaria raised the issue of the existence of radical Islamic centers and religious schools already established and operating among the Pomaks. Ensuing media reports¹⁷⁵ confirmed the existence of such private schools. Some also elaborated on the possible link between Chief Mufti office and the Al—Waqf al-Islami Saudi foundation. The issue of religious education of young Muslims in the Arab world was also brought to the attention of the public. The media also fit in such information into the common terrorist threat rhetoric.

For example, the Bulgarian newspaper “24 Chasa” (24 Hours) claimed it “knew a dozen Bulgarian citizens who maintained close ties with the AQ network.” At the same time, the private television station bTV, part of Rupert Murdoch’s media conglomerate, claimed that the Arab community was becoming more active in Bulgaria and that emissaries of radical Muslim organizations had been spotted in the country.¹⁷⁶

Despite the fact that the Bulgarian security services played down such reports, the issue of Islamic revival has been still left out of the discussion of the spread of radical Islam in Bulgaria. The issue in the media has been clouded by the post 9/11 rhetoric that “necessarily attached the label ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to a wide range of Muslim beliefs and practices.”¹⁷⁷

The following section attempts to clarify some of the issues and offer an anthropological and SMT analysis of the Islamic revival among the Bulgarian Muslims.

2. H2: The Observed Islamic Revival, Depending on the Characteristics of the Social Terrain of Various Balkan States, Constitutes the Initial Phase of the Emergence of Local Islamic Movements

My principal contention here is that H2 is alike H1 fails to be confirmed by the developments on the ground. Nevertheless, following the suggested analytical framework, I argue that the process of the social appropriation of Wahhabi Islam combined with the social terrain changes in the Pomak minority actually provide general

¹⁷⁵ Shkodrova and Roudnikova.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

support for the penetration of radical Islam in the country. Nonetheless, the studied phenomena actually led to further isolation of the Bulgarian Muslims that might lead in the future, along with marginal elements in MRF, to a possible irredentist agenda.

In comparison to Bosnia, there have been no youth organizations among the Bulgarian Muslims that can provide insight of the possible changes in the social terrain. Nevertheless, the field studies available account for a similar transformation of traditional relations into a more dynamic contention between younger and older generations of Muslims. Usually sources of such contention are the returning Muslim students from the Middle East and/or the ones that fell under the spell of the religious missionaries. Here, I offer a brief analysis of the social dynamics and appropriation of radical Islam among the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.

Generally, during the communist rule due to the assimilation campaigns, elders played an important role in terms of preserving the religious beliefs and keeping family memories. As Ragaru (2001) indicated, the age factor seems to play a significant role in redefining the relations with the larger Islamic world. It seems that among the old people folk, Islam is likely to remain predominant. As most of the Muslims between 50-60 years of age were raised during the communism era, they seem to be more secularized than the young generation for which religion constitutes a component of the current identity strategies.¹⁷⁸ As Ghodsee (2005) observed, “there are considerable tensions between secular Muslims and the more devout members of their community.”¹⁷⁹ Against the fast emerging foreign sponsored religious seminars and schools, the more secular Bulgarian Pomaks actually use the word “fanatics” to refer to those who have recently become more faithful to Islamic traditions from abroad, and there is a fear that these “fanatics” will be the cause of renewed oppressions against the Pomaks on the part of the Bulgarian government. In addition, she attested to the rising influence of the returning students from the Middle East and the continual change of religious practices.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Ragaru, 28.

¹⁷⁹ Kristen Ghodsee, “The Miniskirt or the Veil: Gender, International Aid, and Islamic Revivalism on the Edge of Europe,” research report prepared for International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), n. d., <http://www.irex.org/programs/iaro/research/05-06/Ghodsee.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Still, such a social dynamic has gone almost unnoticed for the general Christian and even Turkish population. There have been indications of growing tensions between the Pomak and Christian minority in the Rhodope that has led to the emergence of a radical nationalistic party “Attack.” Still, due to the abdication of the state forming these areas, traditional Pomaks are basically left to themselves in terms of countering the growing influence of Wahhabi Islam. Nevertheless, the current accounts lack to present any cultural frames that might catalyze a further mobilization of contention. Certainly, the freshly educated youth, despite gaining influence due to their posts of imams in the newly built mosques, still meet considerable resistance from the more traditional population. One of the effects witnessed on the ground is the continual isolation of Pomaks from the rest of the society. Such a social effect only exacerbates the common perception of the Christian population and gives food for thought as it suggests a possible emergence of an irredentist movement in the south.

It is still unclear how the process of the social appropriation of Wahhabi religious practices and the emerging contention between young and older Pomaks will develop in the future. So far it is clear that until the state fails to come up with adequate policy that can solve the economic problems of that minority and discourage radical religious education abroad through viable domestic alternatives, the process of Islamic revival can only further weaken the more secular part of the population. In addition, in the near and mid-term perspective such processes left unattended can be irreversible and can lead to the possible emergence of an ethnic Pomak party or parties after the example of MRF. Such a perspective could lead to a direct clash with the state as the formation of such a party would be in direct violation of the Confessional Act (2002). Such implications will be further discussed in Chapter V.

F. CONCLUSIONS

Among other findings, this case study of Bulgaria shows that the issue of Islamic revival has to be analyzed on a case by case basis. I demonstrated that this phenomenon has different scope and manifestations depending on the evolution of state-minority relations and the ability to utilize the political opportunities after 1991.

This chapter was able to effectively show that the existence of several Islamic minorities inevitably leads to a certain level of competition and self-reinforcing divergent

identity constructs. Thus, as the Turkish minority more or less secured its position in the Bulgarian society due to the balancing political role of MFR on the political scene, I argued that of particular concern are the changes in the social terrain and dynamics in the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims.

My analysis has demonstrated that the Islamic revival among the Pomaks necessarily has the characteristics of an internal phenomenon aimed at reinforcing their identity and elevating their religious position vis-à-vis the Turks. At the same time, such a demand has been maintained by the influx of financial support and missionaries from the Middle East. The chapter also showed that like Bosnia, the returning students of Islam, and to a certain extent the foreign missionaries, are the spearhead of such a revival.

At the same time, one of the important findings of this chapter is that unlike the case of Bosnia where the majority of the population is Muslim, the IR in Bulgaria does not have the dynamics or characteristics of an emerging social movement. It might well have started as such in 1989 as a reaction to the state oppression and assimilation process. Nevertheless, with the emergence of MFR and the lack of any viable contention frames, the IR among the Turks has been manifesting itself along the same lines as the Christian or Jewish revival.

In contrast, the IR among the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, due to their geographical isolation, historical legacy, results of state policy, their image and the perception they have in the Bulgarian society has taken a rather surprising turn towards gradual isolation and reinforcing their differences from the Turkish population. Inevitably, such a development connotes the adoption among the younger generations of Pomaks of more radical Islamic teachings opposite to the ones professed by their elders.

IV. ISLAMIC REVIVAL VS. GLOBAL SALAFI JIHAD

In this chapter, I explore the contentious link between Islamic revival and global Salafi jihad. First, I briefly elaborate on the inadequacies and fallacy of the current analytical frameworks rooted in post-9/11 thought and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in relation to the specifics and developments in the Balkans. Building upon the findings of the case studies, I use the analytical framework suggested in the first chapter in order to investigate the possible relation of the two phenomena in terms of ideological and organizational linkages. The issue of the cartoon publications of the Prophet Muhammad is used as a litmus test for the viability of certain contention frames and the evolution of the Balkan Muslim identity as part of the ummah.

While such an approach allows me to test the third hypothesis of the thesis which posits that there is no casual relationship between the IR and GSJ, on the other hand it permits me to further elaborate on the importance of the social appropriation of a radical brand of Islam (such as Wahhabism). Though this chapter concludes that there is no causal relationship between Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad, I suggest that the existence of organizational and ideological links between the two phenomena in the case of Bosnia and Bulgaria leads to the formation of a permissive environment in which Islamic extremism has the ability and potential to thrive.

A. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SECURITY PARADIGM AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

For almost 100 years the Balkans have been posing security concerns to the rest of the European continent. Due to its location, the region has continuously in the focus of the security experts. Nevertheless, both the exogenous and endogenous accounts necessarily tackle the security challenges to the Balkans in the framework of post 9/11 strategic thought and the rhetoric of GWOT. As Michael Innes (2004) observed, the military interventions in the former Yugoslavia witnessed a radical shift after 2001. “What began in the early 1990s as humanitarian action against state-sponsored repression and as protection for non-combatants has since evolved ...into a mission heavily informed and shaped by global counterterrorism concerns.”¹⁸¹ The implications for the

¹⁸¹ Innes, 297.

Balkans are significant as Bosnia has started to be perceived first as a terrorist haven and then as “gateway for terrorism.”¹⁸² In addition, there has been a wave of public concern that in certain cases amounted to hysteria as the scope and manifestations of the Islamic revival have been associated with the threat of terrorism.¹⁸³

Both phenomena, the spread of GSJ and Islamic revival, have been either conflated or purposefully used to exploit public sentiment. Alleged Macedonian and Serbian security and counterterrorism “experts” tend to use the media in order to pursue nationalistic or other goals. In fact, even the common perception among the security experts in the West lacks the depth and clarity to address the issue. For example, according to a congressional hearing before the Subcommittee on International Relations at the House of Representatives on April 6, 2005, in response to a question, addressing possible AQ’s recruiting in Bosnia, asked by Mr. Ted Poe to Dr. Bruce Hitchner, the latter straightforwardly stated that “There is something called Active Islamic Youth, the AIO (Aktivna Islamska Omladina).¹⁸⁴ We don’t know much about this process, but what is going on with that has been of some concern to people that deal with the security issue side of this issue.”¹⁸⁵

The other analytical extreme that generally suggests an analysis of the Balkans as a logistics and financial base as part of the larger phenomenon of “crossover between terrorist groups” does not take into consideration the changes in the social terrain in the Balkans states and the evolving social relations as shown in the case studies. Indeed, it addresses the issue of “operatives” and “supporters” but it does not go further than recognizing both categories as “terrorists of the same caliber.”¹⁸⁶ At the same time there have been considerable efforts to employ social network analysis in order to “map

¹⁸² Starr.

¹⁸³ Shkodrova and Roudnikova.

¹⁸⁴ Active Islamic Youth (AIO) or its abbreviation in Bosnian AIY are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.

¹⁸⁵ House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfinished Business: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats*, Serial No. 109-22, 109th Congress, 1st Session, April 6, 2005, p. 27.

¹⁸⁶ Mathew Levitt, “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups,” *SAIS Review*, XXIV no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004), 34, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v024/24.1levitt.html, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

terrorist networks”.¹⁸⁷ Valdis Krebs admits the limitations of such an approach restating the findings of Sparrow (1991) that incompleteness, fuzzy boundaries and dynamic are the three insurmountable problems when dealing with a “terrorist network.”¹⁸⁸ Here, I suggest the incorporation of SMT and anthropological approaches in order to improve the current analysis.

Thus, the main contention of this chapter is that the mechanistic application of such analytical approaches to the Balkans does not take into account the process of Islamic revival and/or historic development of the region. Without operationalizing the IR and its possible implications to and/or connection with GSJ, the applied governmental practices influenced by the EU and U.S. might actually have a blowback effect that would only exacerbate and/or escalate the current situation. Thus, the next section elaborates on the potential link between the two phenomena and offers indications and warnings (I&W) for the mid-term as long as long-term perspective.

B. TESTING H3

I posited in the first chapter the third hypothesis that this thesis aims at testing, i.e. that there is no casual relationship between IR and GSJ. In order to do that there are several clarifications that need to be made from the outset. For the purpose of this section I am not going to incorporate in my analysis the general Islamic revival; rather, as depicted in the analytical framework in Chapter I, I am more interested in the extreme manifestations of this phenomenon that are adrift from the historic path of Islam the local population has taken over the centuries. To put it straight I elaborate on Wahhabism both as a radical brand of Islam that emanates from salafism which provides religious foundation for the GSJ, and as part and parcel of the current IR on the Balkans.

As Guilain Denoeux pointed out *salafism* (al-salafiyyaa in Arabic) did not develop as a monolithic movement but rather as a broad philosophy, a frame of mind. In the past two decades, however, one particular brand of salafi ideology, namely Wahhabism, has acquired particular success. “What eventually emerged was a particularly puritanical, bland, ultra-orthodox and forbidding interpretation of Islam, concerned if not obsessed,

¹⁸⁷ Marc Sageman and Valdis Krebs are currently among most prominent in this effort.

¹⁸⁸ Valdis Krebs, “Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells,” *CONNECTIONS* 24, no. 3, (2001), <http://www.sfu.ca-insna/Connections-Web/Volume 24-3/Valdis.Krebs.web.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

with notions of moral corruption and the need for purity.”¹⁸⁹ Such an outline presupposes a religious (ideological) link between the extreme manifestations of Islamic revival in terms of Wahhabism and global Salafi jihad.

The findings of the case studies presuppose the existence of both – ideological and structural conversion of the extreme manifestations of IR (Wahhabi penetration of the region) and the spread of GSJ. I explore this possible ideological connection through further analysis of the process of social appropriation of radical Islam.

Second, as shown more in the case of Bosnia than that of Bulgaria, the spread and promotion of Wahhabi ideas have been organizationally sustained by ITAN, the mujaheed that stayed in Bosnia after 1995 or the foreign missionaries (the latter especially in the case of Bulgaria). Thus, I analyze the possible structural convergence of IR and GSJ as the same agents have been penetrated by global Salafi movement or used as fronts of AQ.

1. Exploring the Structural Conversion

The link between the Islamic charities and NGOs, on the one side, and al-Qaeda, on the other, has been established already by the law enforcement agencies both in the US and in the Balkans. According to a CIA report, of the more than 50 Islamic non-governmental organizations that existed in 1996, “available information indicates that approximately one-third of these Islamic NGOs support terrorist groups or employ individuals who are suspected of having terrorist connections.”¹⁹⁰ In the case of Bosnia, there have been long standing concerns in the European and U.S. intelligence services that several charities that operated in Bosnia during and after that country's civil war were being used as a cover for Al-Qaeda activities.¹⁹¹ In the spring of 2002, under U.S. supervision, Bosnian authorities raided several charities and closed three of them – the al-

¹⁸⁹ Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” *Middle East Policy Council Journal* IX, no. 2 (June 2002), 3.

¹⁹⁰ Affidavit of Special Agent David Kane, United States of America vs. Soliman S. Bosniaeiri, 03-365-A (District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia) as quoted by Avram Hein, “A Long-Time Threat,” *FRONTPAGEMAG.com*, October 19, 2004, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=15571>, last accessed on October 13, 2005 and Evan Kohlmann, *Al-Qaeda Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network*, (Oxford, New York: Berg, 2004), 36.

¹⁹¹ “Bosnia, 1 Degree Separation from Al-Qaeda,” *The Centre for Peace in the Balkans*, July 2003, <http://www.balkanpeace.org/our/our15.shtml>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Global Relief Foundation and Bosanska Idealna Futura (BIF), which is a branch of the Chicago-based Benevolence International Foundation. As a result, these entities have been designated as financiers of terrorism under Executive Order 13224 and the United Nations added these names to the list of those whose assets must be blocked by all member nations under UNSCR 1390.¹⁹² In addition to the indictments brought against Enaam Arnaout,¹⁹³ the U.S. transferred six individuals, a.k.a. “the Algerian Group,” accused (but acquitted by the Bosnian Supreme Court) of plotting of bomb attacks against the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo and Guantanamo Base in Cuba in 2002. The Algerian Group also showed the role of the High Saudi Commission for Relief of appropriating funds for terrorist financing.

In addition to the material support, Evan Kohlmann (2004) gave an elaborate account of the place that Bosnia acquired during the 1992-1995 war as a link between AQ leadership based in Afghanistan and the establishment of sleeper cells in Western Europe.¹⁹⁴ Such a link has been kept active despite the end of the war. Evidence shows that the territory of Bosnia had been used by al-Qaeda (and predominantly Maghreb Arabs¹⁹⁵) as a transit point, logistic support, and/or for planning and coordinating purposes for the preparation of the attacks on the USS Cole and French Supertanker Limburg, the Embassy bombings, the Millennium plot, the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and finally the October 2005 plots to bomb the British and U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.¹⁹⁶ In this regard, the International Crisis Group report on al-Qaeda came up with the findings that “endemic Balkan problems – inept governance, poor public security, weak

¹⁹² United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Benevolence International Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism,” (November 19, 2002), PO-3632, <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3632.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁹³ Kevin Johnson and Richard Willing, “Bosnian Evidence Makes FBI Case,” *USA Today*, May 1, 2002, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002/05/01/charity-terrorism.htm>, last accessed on October 13, 2005. Also see Esad Hecimovic, “Enaam Arnaout – Indicted, Humanitarian Worker, and a Bosnian: Bin Laden’s Affiliate and/or Friend” [Enaam Arnaout, optizenik, humanitarac, i Bosanac: Bin Ladenov suradnik i(li) poznanik] Dani, May 10, 2002, <http://bhdani.com/arhiva/256/t25610.shtml>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

¹⁹⁴ Kohlmann, 185-226.

¹⁹⁵ Kohlmann calls this segment of AQ North-African sleeper cell network. Nevertheless, here I stick to Marc Sageman’s (2004) typology of AQ. For more, see Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Penn, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2004), (137-139).

¹⁹⁶ “Bosnia 1 Degree Separation from Al-Qaeda.”

rule of law, economic backwardness, corruption and organized crime – produce an environment where terrorist networks can hide personnel and money.”¹⁹⁷

Nevertheless, despite the fact that ITAN provided material support to AQ, the issue that the same charities and Bin Laden’s affiliates were used as agents to promote radical Islamic Salafi teachings has often been ignored. Such research efforts have been confined only to the war time period of 1992-1995 when “Al-Qaida has used populist dogma clothed in vague and fanciful notions of religious and Islamic history to recruit war-scarred, shell-shocked volunteers who have lost all sense of individual identity and self-worth.”¹⁹⁸ While the issue of whether the Bosnians lost their sense of identity in the face of the Serbian and Croat threat is a debatable one, the fact that AQ employed a number of prominent clerics such as Imad el-Misri (the religious leader of El-Mujahid unit)¹⁹⁹ and Shaykh Abu Talal al-Qasimy (a.k.a. Talaat Fouad Qassem) remains a fact on the ground.²⁰⁰ As seen in the next section, these individuals were actively involved in Salafi preaching and de facto helped Wahhabism establish itself in Bosnia. Such a causal link explaining the Islamic Revival taking a definite Wahhabi radical twist due to the influx of mujaheed and ITAN in Bosnia is evident in the case of Central Bosnia, namely in Zenica, Tishanj, and Bocinja Donja.²⁰¹

Still, as evident from the Bosnian case study, the proselytization of radical Islam not only continued through the activity of the mujaheed who stayed in Bosnia after the war, but also evolved into organized Wahhabi youth organizations such as Active Islamic Youth and Young Muslims. Still, my principal contention here is that the structural link between GSJ and radical IR, though present on the ground during the war, has been considerably weakened to the point of non-existence due to the security measures implemented by the Bosnian government especially after 9/11. I claim that such a causal

197 “Bin Laden and the Balkans: the Politics of Anti-Terrorism,” *International Crisis Group*, November 9, 2001, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2079&l=1>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

198 Kohlmann, 223.

199 Hecimovic, 4.

200 Kohlmann, 26-27.

201 Jeffrey Smith, “A Bosnian Village's Terrorist Ties; Links to U.S. Bomb Plot Arouse Concern About Enclave of Islamic Guerrillas,” *Washington Post*, March 11, 2000, <http://www.balkanpeace.org/wtb/wtb12.shtml>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

link could have only existed during the war when the mobilization frames for fighting the Serbs could be easily conflated with religious radicalism. I suggest that in the case of Bosnia we have already witnessed different dynamics that encompass, as outlined above, several radical youth organizations with their own constituency and agenda. It has also been evident from the Bosnian case study that other radical Middle Eastern organizations continually vie for the support of the local populace. Still, we need not lose sight of another reality – the availability of what Sageman terms as “links to jihad.” It is unclear how the existent local Wahhabi organizations interact or whether there is any such relation between them and GSJ operatives. The arrests in October 2005 and recent statements by Bosnian officials allude to such contacts. For example, according to Sredoje Novic, the director of the Bosnian State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) in a series of interviews for the Bosnian newspapers (*Glas javnosti* daily – December 2003, and *Nezavisne novine*, January 2006) stated that “there are many indicators that Bosnia-Herzegovina has retained seed of those prepared to commit many terrorist attacks....SIPA needs to investigate the level of radicalization of some forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and whether this radicalization is oriented towards eventual terrorist actions. There are realistic chances of training of terrorists for certain forms of terrorism.”²⁰²

In the case of Bulgaria the structural link is as much in the realm of populist political rhetoric as it is on the ground. The lack of any comprehensive field studies elaborating on the penetration of radical Islamic organizations or NGOs in the ethnically mixed areas is further complicated by the internecine fighting for control over the Chief Mufti office. As soon as Bulgaria stood as a strong supporter of the U.S. in the war on terror, these infightings necessarily resorted to using terrorist threat rhetoric that has been easily picked up by the media and raved up by the general Bulgarian public. Still, though more or less the public concerns for the past several years combined with the balancing role of MRF in Bulgarian politics led to the emergence of an outright nationalistic party

²⁰² “Bosnian Muslim TV Criticizes Officials’ Statements on Terrorism, Global News Wire – Asia Africa Intelligence Wire,” Copyright 2006 BBC Monitoring/BBC Source: Financial Times Information Limited BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 30, 2006, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

such as “Attack” in the 2005 Parliamentary elections, the media accounts differ from the ones provided by the security services.

The general perception is that Bulgarian Muslims “may be in contact with foreign organizations which are more conservative than the majority of local believers are familiar with, but it does not mean that the Wahhabi faith or other fundamentalist denominations are spreading in the country.”²⁰³ Thus far, several foundations have been implicated as posing danger to the national security of the country, among them Al-Waqf al Islami, which provides funding for new mosques and Muslim schools, and Taiba, as its director Abdullah Mohamed was expelled from Bulgaria in 1998. Still, reports are to an extent contradictory as the rhetoric that is used is misleading and mainly centered around GWOT. Ex-chief secretary of the Ministry of Interior pointed out several times that the police “had launched two or three operations against Muslim missionaries at Velingrad and Pazardzik in the south”²⁰⁴ Such steps were allegedly taken in order to “prevent terrorist groups gaining a foothold in Bulgaria.”²⁰⁵

2. Exploring the Religious Connection

The major finding of the presented case studies put forward the continuous social appropriation of Salafi Islam and specifically its Wahhabi brand. In this section, I elaborate on how such a process relates to the three general steps of joining jihad as identified by Marc Sageman – social affiliation, intensification of beliefs and encountering a link to jihad.

As I posited in the first chapter, for the purpose of this thesis I take Marc Sageman’s and Jason Burke’s definition²⁰⁶ of GSJ as an Islamic revivalist social movement. Certainly, this thesis accounts for what Sageman (2004) terms as “fundamental issue of specificity”²⁰⁷ and, in addition, takes into consideration that his study looks more at the social settings relevant to the West than the ones predominant in

²⁰³ Shkodrova and Roudnikova.

²⁰⁴ “Jihad in Bulgaria,” *Jihad Watch*, January 13, 2004, <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/000625.php>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 63-64; and Burke, 291 (see note 35).

²⁰⁷ Sageman, 69.

the Balkans. In this respect, against his conclusions, I incorporate the findings of the case studies that deal with the changes of the social terrain. Several issues need to be outlined as general characteristics of the process of joining GSJ that I will later correlate to the process of Islamic revival.

First, there is the religious and social dimension of joining jihad. Sageman concludes that the latter is far more important than the former as “social bonds are the critical element in the process and precede ideological commitment.”²⁰⁸ Second, the lack of resources invested in any recruitment drive is an issue. Sageman’s testimony that he “did not detect any active top-down organizational push to increase al Qaeda’s membership”²⁰⁹ was confirmed by Jason Burke’s (2004) findings. Burke elaborated on the third phase of the evolution of AQ during which “the ‘hardcore’ is scattered, the ‘network of networks’ broken up. All that remains is the idea of ‘al-Qaeda’. You are a member of al-Qaeda if you say you are.”²¹⁰ Such a conclusion elevates the importance of the bottom-up recruitment and the “links to jihad.” The third issue is the importance of embeddedness and cliques as part of the social networking and jihad. The first term refers to the rich nexus of social and economic linkages between the members of an organization and environment. The latter brings to the forefront the importance of small tightly-knit groups.²¹¹

Despite the sources of Islamic revival in the Balkans, whether externally or internally driven, the case studies concluded that despite the fact that both processes of IR in Bosnia and Bulgaria fell short of having the dynamics and depth of a full-fledged social movements, nevertheless they share one common characteristic according to Doug McAdam’s analytical framework, and that is the continual social appropriation of Salafi ideas. Such social appropriation has been developing through relational (using the described above structural agents) and non-relational diffusion of ideas. As a matter of fact, the increased proselytization and spread of Wahhabism has been one of the major characteristics of the IR in Bosnia (especially through the youth organizations in the

208 Sageman, 135.

209 Ibid., 123.

210 Burke, 290

211 Sageman, 146, 152.

central parts of the country) and to a lesser extent in Bulgaria. Yet, many Muslims share Salafi (Wahhabi) beliefs but stop short of preaching extremism or employing violence. Here, I suggest that we should be very careful in drawing any preliminary conclusions out of the evident spread of Wahhabism as there is a danger of falling into the common fallacy of lumping together the peaceful Wahhabi praying in the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo and the mujahedin plotting to blow the British or US embassy in Sarajevo.²¹² Sageman also warned against the use of an ideological appeal thesis outlined above. Such a thesis implies that people would randomly join the movement simply by being exposed to its ideology. The stronger the exposure the greater the recruitment would be. Nevertheless, as Sageman pointed out, “historically, joining AQ was definitely not a random process. One of its surprising features was its complete failure to recruit members where its headquarters and training camps were located....Therefore the bonds of terror did not form spontaneously by mere exposure as implied in the mass ideological appeal thesis.”²¹³

In the same vein, the existence of a structural link between IR and GSJ does not necessarily presuppose an ideological one. Still, the question remains – how should the social appropriation be interpreted, especially if one tries to provide for a mid- or long-term analysis? It seems that in the Bulgarian case, the competitive environment created by several minorities accounts for such an appropriation while, at the same time, the availability of a “link to jihad” (as termed by Sageman) has not sufficiently been proved. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the lack of top-down recruitment and the established existence of links of jihad, the Bosnian case raises some eyebrows. Most probably, based on the available data, the scrupulous desk officer or analyst would conclude that the social appropriation of Salafi ideas plus the active involvement of 1992-1995 war-veterans in creating and sustaining Wahhabi youth organizations equals to a fertile ground for jihadi recruitment not to mention the existing mosque-network and ITAN in the country. Such a proposition does not seem to be far away from reality, as it is evident that CIA’s analysis and operations most probably have been following the outlined rationale. For example, the agency sent in September 2003 Abdurahman Khadr to Bosnia

²¹² Here, I refer to the October and November, 2005 arrests in Bosnia, Denmark and Sweden.

²¹³ Sageman, 119.

in order to blend in with the transient Muslim population, attend the King Fahd mosque, and then to go to Iraq with AQ forces.²¹⁴ Still, there has not been any confirmed data of AQ recruiting local Bosnians, or at least not in the available open sources. The availability of structural agents of GSJ and the lack of local recruitment, despite the fertile ground that Wahhabi ideas are getting among some segments of the population mainly in central Bosnia, seems to be in initial contrast with Sageman's findings. I suggest that in order to explain such a reality in the region, the issues of embeddedness and social cliques suggested by Sageman have to be turned around and analyzed in the context of the Balkans.

Sageman interprets embeddedness in terms of "social and economic linkages between the members of an organization."²¹⁵ Viewing his sample of jihadists, he concluded that because they were not embedded into the Western societies and lacked the social bonds that tied them to the local people, thus they were freed from responsibilities and local concerns. Sageman even argued that such an absence of connection is "a necessary condition for a network of people to join the GSJ."²¹⁶ Here, I argue that in the case of the Balkans, the issue of embeddedness should be considered the other way around. Thus, the dichotomy in the above case studies between states with a majority and minority of Muslim population actually comes into an important play. In the case of Bosnia the existence of Muslims as a majority, combined with the influx of ITAN during the 1992-1995 war and the infiltration of AQ in the central part of Bosnia, provided for the high degree of embeddedness of the GSJ network in the local social terrain. The organizational chart presented by Kohlmann (2003) showing the dispersion of Bosnia mujahedeen and their participation in several terrorist plots in Europe and North Africa actually shows only one side of the phenomena. The convergent line of GSJ and IR is evident in the case of Imad el-Misri and radical returning students of Islam from the Arab countries. I showed in the Bosnian case study how these structural agents were actually instrumental in the changes in social terrain and the social appropriation of Salafi ideas.

214 "Interview: Abdurahman Khadr," *PBS Frontline: Son of Al Qaeda*, April 22, 2004, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/khadr/family/cron.html>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

215 Sageman, 146.

216 Ibid., 147.

Thus, my main contention here is that the structural and, to a certain extent ideological convergence between IR and GSJ in the case of Bosnia, should not be viewed necessarily as a breeding ground for recruitment, but rather as a permissive environment in which the phenomenon of GSJ thrives. The notion of a permissive environment is tied to the moral and most probably material support similar to the support that Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic receive in Republika Srpska. I also argue that in concentrating too much on finding causal linkages between these two phenomena, most of the analytical accounts miss the evolution of IR and its possible potential for growing into a viable Islamic social movement which scope and scale are hard to predict. I would also suggest that most probably among some segments of the Bosnian Muslim population, the resurgence of Islam was tied unequivocally with the adherence to radical Salafi ideas close to the ideology of GSJ. For example, between 1992 and 1995, more than two thousand Bosniaks went through a forty days of religious training as a precondition for admittance into the el-Mujahid brigade. Whether they fought so that they could pursue a nationalist agenda or GSJ is an arguable issue, as in the second chapter I showed that it was mainly the former rather than the latter. Nevertheless, one should not lose sight of the continual existence and growth of Salafi youth organizations long after the war. In addition, the thesis of brewing social movement dynamics is supported by the growing contention against the official Islamska zajednica. Of particular interest is whether the degree of separation between IR and GSJ is the lack of viable mutual contention frames. Most of these contention frames outlined in the second chapter and viewed in regard to the IR and its potential as a SM are actually more nationalistic rather than religious-based. While answering such a question goes beyond the scope of this thesis, the reaction to the cartoon publication in Bosnia showed if nothing else the increased association of the Bosnians with the global Muslim agenda. On the other hand, the repetitive statements of Bosnian Chief Mufti that call for the process of “institutionalization of Islam in Europe”²¹⁷ deserve further attention and will be discussed in the next chapter.

The case of Bulgaria is quite different from that of Bosnia. As shown in the previous section and in the third chapter, it is hard to find any structural link to GSJ

217 “Bosnia: Mufti Says EU and European Muslims Must Work Together,” *adnkronosinternational*, January 9, 2006, http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Religion&luid=8.0.247399278&par, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

except for several foundations as Taiba (the same one that operated in Bosnia) and some expelled individuals. Still, as the case study indicated, of particular concern is the Bulgarian-speaking Muslim minority for whom the appropriation of Salafi social practices and ideology is viewed as an identity multiplier against the Turkish minority. Here, it is hard to discuss the issue of embeddedness because of the lack of an adequate structural link to GSJ. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing the possible implications of an IR with such a Salafi ideological twist. The end results have been the further isolation of that minority from the rest of the population. Such isolation also raises concerns as the intensification of certain beliefs and practices provides fertile ground for Arab missionaries. Still, though these beliefs and practices seem to be close to Salafism, it is not quite clear to what extent they are accepted in the depth and content that a Wahhabi embraces them. I posit here that of particular interest are the retuning students of Islam from the Middle East. Though there has not been relevant research or field studies in this area, I posit here that their social activity and the circles that they create might be close to the characteristics to what Sageman defines as cliques. Their intense networking with the youths and sometimes open confrontation with the elders suggest that they are potential structural drivers of the current IR. What is unclear is to what extent, such a change of the social terrain makes it susceptible to jihadi influence or possible recruitment. Emblematic is the fact that the cartoon issue did not resonate with this minority in Bulgaria. Actually, it spurred demonstrations by the growing Arab population in the capital.

C. CONCLUSION

The current chapter explored the possible structural and ideological links between GSJ and Islamic revival on the Balkans. My analysis has demonstrated that there has been a convergence of the two phenomena during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia as the agents of GSJ that gained access in the central part of the country also proselytized radical Salafi jihad among the local populace. Nevertheless, I was able to show that though such links have been considerably weakened after the war, the continual appropriation of the Wahhabi brand of Islam has acquired its own momentum, propelled by the indigenous Bosnian youth organizations – AIY and Young Muslims. Still, as the Islamic revival and GSJ are current on-going phenomena it is unclear to what extent the spread of the Salafi version of Islam in Bosnia connotes any ideological facilitation or link to GSJ.

While such indications and warnings have to be monitored and timely analyzed, one of the principal findings of the chapter is that the changes the above structural agents introduced to the social terrain in Bosnia and Bulgaria vary depending on either the relation among the different Muslim minorities (as in the case of Bulgaria) or the continual appropriation of radical Islam through indigenous youth organizations. While the chapter was not able to establish a present causal relation between GSJ and IR, I argued for the importance of other factors on the ground. Thus, the suggested dichotomy between states with a majority and minority of Muslim population provides one way of augmenting and interpreting different issues such as embeddedness and social cliques.

In the case of Bosnia, I suggested that the consequences of the structural, and to a certain extent ideological conversion of GSJ and IR during the 1992-1995 war, should not be viewed necessarily as a breeding ground for recruitment, but rather as a permissive environment in which the phenomena of GSJ thrives. The chapter concluded that such a permissive environment has to be viewed both as moral and probably material support of the radical Islamism. On the other hand, I warned against continual conflation of the process of IR and GSJ as the current U.S. GWOT strategy was skewed in the Balkan settings and led to heightened public fears. In addition, the chapter argued for the need of a qualitatively different analytical approach to the developments on the ground as the potential of the emergence of Islamic movements in Bosnia deserves further investigation. In the case of Bulgaria, I suggested an analysis in which the emergence of radical social circles and cliques²¹⁸ occupies center stage. In addition, this chapter also warned against the possible transformation of Bulgarian Muslims' financial dependence into ideological influence or dependence.

²¹⁸ Here I use the definition of a clique provided by Marc Sageman (2004): "clique – a network in which every node is connected to every other one" (p. 152).

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. OVERVIEW

The Balkans has been a central arena where ongoing trends and phenomena in Europe and the Middle East have interacted and manifested themselves in ways that have had far-reaching effects. For the last 15 years, the Balkans has been subjected to two phenomena which raised particular concerns and public debates, namely Islamic Revival (IR) and global Salafi jihad (GSJ). The events of the last several years show the potential and dynamism of both processes as Hamas' electoral victory and the London attack (07/07/2005) are two of the most recent highlights of the opposite sides of the larger phenomenon of Islamic activism. As far as these processes are still continuing, it is very hard to either construct a comprehensive analytical framework that encompasses all their manifestations and implications or develop adaptive and responsive policy guidelines that address them in depth. Though for the most part current research and analyses either conflate or one-sidedly approach these phenomena, they unequivocally show that Balkan Islam, which includes communities of differing histories and customs, is under the increasing pressure of Islamic radicalism.

Thus, the main research question that this thesis purported to answer is whether the current process of Islamic revival in the Balkans poses a security threat to the region in the context of the rise of global Salafi jihad. In order to contextualize the above stated question, this thesis deconstructed it into two subsidiary research questions which connoted a relevant set of indications and warnings along with adequate security and policy countermeasures - (a) does IR constitute the initial phase of the emergence of Islamic social movement dynamics on the ground, and (b) is there a causal relationship or other type of connection between the Islamic revival on the Balkans and the spread of global Salafi jihad?

In an attempt to answer the above stated questions, I suggested operationalizing the Islamic revival in the Balkans through an assessment of the validity of three working hypotheses that exemplify a three-step analytical approach based on comparative case studies. First, the process of Islamic revival is mainly an imported (edic) phenomenon.

Second, the observed Islamic revival, depending on the characteristics of the social terrain in the different Balkan states, constitutes the initial phase of the emergence of local Islamic movements. Third, there is no causal relationship between the Islamic revival and global Salafi jihad.

In order to evaluate them against the findings on the ground, this study also adds on to the current academic and security discussion in several ways. First, it raises the issue of the possible interdependence of the Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad. Second, it offers a comprehensive analytical framework using an interdisciplinary approach centered around the social movement theory that allows for the interpretation of the Islamic revival in the context of the broader phenomena of Islamic activism. In addition, this work not only highlights the unique characteristics and social terrain of the Balkans in difference to the rest of the European continent, but also argues for a differentiated case-by-case analytical approach. In this respect, this thesis suggested dichotomy between Balkan states with a comparative majority and Balkan states with a comparative minority of Muslim population. Finally, based on the suggested analytical framework, I offered a comprehensive analysis of the possible structural and ideological convergence of the Islamic Revival and global Salafi jihad on the Balkans in order to clarify any probable causal relation between the two and further took stock of the possible future evolution of these phenomena.

B. ASSESSING THE HYPOTHESES

The validity of the suggested hypotheses was assessed through the use of comparative case study methodology operationalizing the Islamic revival in accordance with the specifics of the local social terrain. Such an approach allowed for the various manifestations of the research phenomena to be contextualized in terms of the inter-minority relations and the social-cultural memories of the target societies of the Balkans. Thus, the suggested dichotomy between states with a relevant majority and minority of Muslim population turned out to be a useful starting point for the implementation of the suggested at the outset analytical framework.

1. Hypotheses #1 and #2

The process of Islamic revival in the case of Bosnia and Bulgaria, though having different roots, underlying causes and dynamics, initially started as an indigenous

phenomenon. Nevertheless, as both case studies attested to, for the last 15 years it ended up being ideologically sustained (by either foreign emissaries and/or returning students of Islam) and financially supported by Middle Eastern (predominantly Saudi Arabian) charities. In addition, in both states the incumbent Chief Mufti offices have been challenged by the increasing numbers of religious NGOs, thus effectively turning the Balkans into a contested area between radical and moderate Islam. Despite these common features, in each of the cases the current internal dynamics and moving forces of such revival are qualitatively and quantitatively different. In the case of Bosnia, I showed that the current dynamism of the Islamic revival, though lacking viable contemporary mobilization frames, nevertheless thematically has the characteristics and dynamics of an emerging social movement. In the spearhead of such process are the Islamic youth Wahhabi organizations such as AIY or even the more moderate ones like “Young Muslims” (the youth political organization of SDA). Such developments are not only emblematic for the central part of Bosnia which has been mostly exposed to the continuous ideological influence of the foreign *mujahidin*, but also spread to the rest of the country. The recent demonstrations in Sarajevo against the publications of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad provide an interesting case of the Bosnian Muslims mobilized by contentious frames which are common for the rest of the Muslim world.

The case of Bulgaria raises some concerns, as the underlying rivalry between the Bulgarian Muslims and Bulgarian Turk minorities led to the continuous isolation of the former. Though Bulgarian Muslims are relying on external financial support, the Islamic revival among the Pomaks has the characteristics of an internal phenomenon aimed at reinforcing their identity and elevating their position vis-à-vis the Turks. As Georgi Krastev of the state religious directorate confirmed, “wahhabi views may well be spreading in Bulgaria.”²¹⁹ Still, the Bulgarian case poses more questions as to what the real situation on the ground is due to the continual conscious separation of the Bulgarian Muslims from the other Muslim minorities, on the one side, and from the Bulgarian society as a whole, on the other.

²¹⁹ Shkodrova and Roudnikova.

2. Hypothesis #3

Through the assessment of the third hypothesis, this thesis explored the contentious link between IR and GSJ. Its main conclusion is that though there has been a convergence of the two phenomena in the case of BiH during the 1992-1995 war, the existence of possible structural and ideological links between IR and GSJ is questionable and requires further research. Nevertheless, the presented findings raise concerns not because of the lack of direct relation or a causal relationship between the two phenomena, but rather because of the non-relational diffusion that such coexistence has produced. This thesis offers a somewhat different analysis and perspective of the issues on the ground. It suggested that due to the historic conversion of the two phenomena, a major characteristic of the social terrain in both states is the emergence of a permissive environment in which GSJ has the potential to thrive. Such a permissive environment has to be viewed as both moral and most probably material support for GSJ. The October 2005 arrests in Bosnia, Denmark and Sweden showed the real potential of such a non-relational link.

In the case of Bulgaria, the relation between the two phenomena has not been well-established nor has it been objectively debated in the public space. In any case the continual rift among the Muslim leadership of the country along with the persistent financial foreign support and the increasing prominence of the Middle Eastern educated Islamic students raises considerable concerns. The latter involve the possible emergence of autonomy seeking groups and/or the evolution of financial dependency on Saudi charities into an ideological one.

The principal conclusion of this thesis is that whether the Islamic revival in the Balkans entails new security challenges and/or constitutes a security threat to the region mainly depends on the way Balkan governments are handling this phenomenon in times when the region is under the pressure of radical Islam and a vantage point for jihadi operations in Europe. The current policies of the Balkan governments are firmly

grounded in the American understanding and approach of fighting the GWOT.²²⁰ In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report identified European cities with expatriate Muslim communities, especially in central and Eastern Europe, as one of the six primary areas that do or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries.²²¹ Furthermore, being under the pressure of fulfilling their obligations as part of the “coalition against terror,” Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia, and Albania necessarily adopted most of the U.S. rhetoric and policy. The fact that they are part of that coalition raises the fears of the public that these states can become targets of the GSJ because of their support for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, instead of relevant governmental policies addressing the issue of Islamic revival and disentangling it from the phenomenon of GSJ, Balkan states adopted security policies that can be boiled down to stringent security measures and border control that prevents any suspected terrorist from using the Balkans as a transit point to Western Europe. The principal contention of this thesis is that such policies sooner or later are doomed to fail as they do not take into account the indigenous process of the Islamic revival among the local Muslim population that has already acquired its own dynamics and momentum. The October 2005 arrests in Sarajevo, the seizing of caches of explosives and the rumors of renewed activities of training camps in Central Bosnia constitute a chilling reminder that the future security problems of the Balkans most probably will not only emanate from being a transit point between the Middle East and Europe, but also from the internal dynamics of the Islamic revival.

Nevertheless, even among the local Muslim communities and Mufti offices, there seems to be a lack of strong resolution to counter radical Islam. The registration of Muslim Brotherhood’s offshoot in 2002 in Bosnia and the challenges that the Chief Mufti Mustafa Cerić has been facing due to the influx of Middle Eastern religious organizations did not spur any reaction from the Islamic Community in Bosnia. Instead, Mustafa Cerić

220 For an excellent paper on these issues see Gyorgy Lederer, “Countering Islamic Radicals in Eastern Europe,” discussion paper prepared for the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 30, 2005, <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrf.2005-10-17.5799702381/WP-CIST-CEE2.pdf>, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

221 Francis T. Miko, *Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and the U.S. Policy*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, (February 11, 2005), p. 3.

came up with the initiative of “institutionalization of Islam in Europe”²²² which in essence is an admirable idea but only conflates the Islamic problem that Bosnia is facing with the ones that Europe is enduring. It leaves out the question of what kind of Islam should be institutionalized in Europe, as the radical Islamic organizations are already challenging the Bosnian Chief Mufti position of the sole representative of the Muslim community in the country. The problems in Bulgaria, though of a different nature, are still hovering around the rivaling factions aspiring for control of the Mufti office. Such a rivalry deviates a lot of resources and public attention, and necessarily demonizes the Islamic revival and conflates it with the threat of Islamic terrorism.

C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite the fact that we witness these contemporary phenomena and not necessarily have the benefit of the hindsight, it is imperative that the issues the thesis dealt with continue to be researched and analyzed. In the light of the findings of this work, there are several areas of future research which I arrange below in terms of their urgency and importance.

I believe that a good starting point for further discussion of the issue of Islamic revival is that thematically and analytically it should not be dominated by the current GWOT analytical frameworks. Though it is implicitly linked to the spread of GSJ, IR poses qualitatively different policy and security challenges that if not timely applied can lead to convergence of the two phenomena. In this regard, there is a need for comprehensive field studies among the Salafi-dominated central regions of Bosnia and the Bulgarian Muslim-populated southern parts of Bulgaria. In addition, as the current IR is mainly sustained through the returning students of Islam and Arab charities, it is important to further investigate the linkages between the former and the radical circles in the host countries. Of particular importance is to clarify what could be the potential frames that could mobilize the Salafi-dominated regions in Bosnia and turn them either to a viable social Islamic movement or to a recruiting base for GSJ. In the case of Bulgaria of immediate concern is whether the current financial dependence of the Bulgarian Muslim can evolve into an ideological one. In this regard, the planned field studies for the summer of 2006 among the minority by Christy Ghodsee may clarify this question.

²²² “Bosnia Mufti Says EU and European Muslims Must Work Together.”

Another area that draws attention is the increasing number of Arab immigrants in the main cities of the Balkan states. Despite the considerable challenges involved, researching their future role, possible connections, and/or impact on the local Muslim population would provide further insights of the evolution of Islamic revival and GSJ. In the long term, my belief is that future research should incorporate governmental and security experts in order to come up with a comprehensive strategy to counter the possible convergence of IR and GSJ and empower the moderate part of the local Muslims. Of particular interest are the suggestions made by Gyorgy Lederer in 2005.²²³ Though they were discarded at the outset by the EU,²²⁴ I contend that the realities and developments on the ground have shown that academia and security experts are already behind the power curve in following both phenomena.

223 Gyorgy Lederer, "Countering Islamic Radicals in Eastern Europe," discussion paper prepared for the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, September 30, 2005, http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrf_mpf.2005-10-17.5799702381/WP-CIST-CEE2.pdf, last accessed on October 13, 2005.

224 Ibid., 16.

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